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ARMY'S FUNDAMENTALS OF LAND WARFARE: A DOCTRINE FOR NEW TIMES?

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Army’s Fundamentals of Land Warfare

A Doctrine For ‘New Times’?

Graeme Cheeseman

The Australian Army’s manual of *Land War Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (LWD1) sets out how the Army and its leaders currently think about, and plan to prepare for, conflict and war in the post-Cold War era. In his preface to the document, the Chief of Army states that LWD1 is very much a ‘work in progress: a dynamic document aimed at encouraging vigorous analysis and debate’. In line with this call, this paper examines LWD1’s main arguments and prescriptions under four headings: 1) Doctrine or dogma? 2) A doctrine for war or peace? 3) The principles of which war? and 4) Other issues. It concludes that while LWD1 is an important first step in the (re)development of Army’s strategic doctrine, it needs further thought and work before it will fully satisfy either its purported roles or provide a reasonable or even relevant appraisal of war and peace in the twenty-first century.

The paper is part of a submission by the author to the inquiry of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade into ‘The suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war’.

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1. Introduction

Issued in March 1999 the Australian Army's manual of *Land War Doctrine 1 The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (LWD 1) sets out how the Army and its leaders think about, and plan to prepare for, conflict and war in the new millennium. In his preface to the document, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, states that this latest edition of the manual retains much of the organisation's existing doctrine which has been 'developed from years of experience and paid for in blood'. He adds that LWD1 also seeks to take into account fundamental changes taking place as a result of the so-called revolution in military affairs — which 'requires a continuous transformation from an *industrial-age* to an *information-age* Army' — and other developments in our international milieu. Hickling acknowledges that these changes are as yet uncompleted and their implications far from certain. As a result LWD1 is merely 'a step in the Army's intellectual journey into the information age. It therefore should be treated very much as a "work in progress": a dynamic document aimed at encouraging vigorous analysis and debate'.

This paper takes up the Chief of Army's challenge, examining what it says (and doesn't say) and analysing the arguments and contentions that are used to justify its content and conclusions. It is informed by the view that *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* is as much an exercise in politics as an expression of doctrine. It seeks not only to meld the old with the new or to reflect the future in the present, but also to balance what is needed with what is possible and to reconcile what is familiar and comfortable with what is not. The struggle to accommodate these different and often conflicting forces and perspectives is evident throughout the document. It begins with the Chief of Army's own message: the Army 'exists to provide land forces that are capable of fighting and winning battles', yet the transformation from the industrial to a post-industrial age will require the Army to 'contribute to both *warfighting* and *military support* operations'. It is reflected in the way the story of land warfare in the twenty-first century is presented and justified. It underpins the various tensions and contradictions, described shortly, in the narrative itself. And it alerts us to certain silences, closures and disjunctures in the document's flow and its method of argumentation.

Overall LWD1 is a bold document. As an intellectual exercise, it is important and well overdue. It recognises that changes are required and seeks to develop these both rationally and openly. It contains much that is interesting, informative and challenging. Yet, the glowing testimonials on its back cover notwithstanding, LWD1 does not fully come to terms with the revolutionary nature of our 'new times' and its implications, not only for the future role of military force(s) in international affairs but the future contexts in which the Australian Army will be required to operate. LWD1 is an important first step in the development of Army doctrine for the coming century but it needs further thought and work before it will fully satisfy either its purported roles or any reasonable test of applicability. These two underlying concerns inform the remainder of this paper which begins by examining whether LWD1 meets its doctrinal role and then looks at whether the story that is told represents a reasonable or even relevant appraisal of war and peace in the twenty-first century.

2. Doctrine or dogma?

LWD1's treatment of the role of doctrine is overly truncated and difficult to follow. It seems to suggest, reasonably in my view, that doctrine serves two basic purposes. It provides, first, a conceptual framework for helping understand the nature of armed conflict and the potential use of military force(s) in national and international affairs. Second, doctrine enunciates a set of principles for guiding military planners and decision makers in developing the strategies, policies, force capabilities and actions needed to achieve or support specific tasks or objectives. Thus doctrine has both an educative and an informative role. It encourages practitioners to think about (and presumably question) their professional discipline and its underlying historical, experiential and theoretical

assumptions. And it assists them to apply these insights to specific circumstances or operational settings.[1]

These two purposes serve to distinguish doctrine from policy and strategy. Doctrinal guidelines may inform the policy making process or the choice of a particular strategic option, but the doctrine itself is developed and exists independently of national security policies and defence strategies. Because of this doctrine, at the philosophical and strategic level in particular, is said to be 'authoritative' but not 'prescriptive'. It is not a set of rules to be followed without question, but guidelines which require judgement, open-mindedness and flexibility in their application. Furthermore, because it is based on history and experience, doctrine is more enduring and broadly couched than either policy or strategy. While doctrine may be enduring, however, it is not immutable. As LWD1 states, 'doctrine evolves in response to changes in political, strategic, economic, environmental, societal and technological circumstances'.

The document further notes that, in Army's case, 'there are three types of doctrine: philosophical, application and procedural'.[2] Philosophical doctrine 'explains fundamental principles of military operations' whereas application and procedural doctrine describe how these principles should be applied in different circumstances or operational settings. LWD1 is primarily philosophical. It is said to be a 'keystone' document which 'guides the development of *all* Army doctrine'. It 'enunciates the Army's core beliefs on the conduct of military operations'. And it 'provides the foundation for sound military judgement' at the strategic, operational and tactical levels (emphasis added).

While LWD1 claims to meet the educative and informative roles it sets for doctrine, in practice it achieves neither of these goals fully or satisfactorily. This is in part because it insists on restricting its considerations of Army's future operational milieu to war and its future role to fighting or preparing to fight wars. As such, LWD1 provides a highly selective and, I would suggest, inadequate conceptual framework for considering the roles of land forces and the land component of military power in the twenty-first century. Its focus on war also means it provides inadequate guidance for those Army planners and commanders who will be required to deal with non-conflictual situations or contribute to so-called 'operations other than war'. Even LWD1's treatment of future land warfare, discussed in detail shortly, leaves much to be desired, looking only at the impact of technology on the application of military power, and ignoring how technological and other systemic changes might be affecting the various political, strategic, and social contexts in which armies in the future will have to operate.

As a 'keystone' document and one that is meant to provide an intellectual bridge between theory and experience on the one hand and practice on the other, we might also expect LWD1 either to contain, or provide references to, 'state-of-the-art' or 'state-of-the discipline' summaries or overviews, as well as discussions of, or pointers to, the key issues and questions concerning contemporary historians, policy makers and theorists. Yet, apart from a few references in Chapter 2 to Australian wartime operations, there is nothing in the document to indicate that its drafters have studied or are aware of these issues. More importantly, there is nothing to help those military planners who wish, or feel the need, to read into or research a particular issue or topic in order better to understand or inform their policy or strategic advice.

Given the emphasis placed on combined and joint force operations, we might also expect LWD1 to at least mention Australia's existing air power and maritime doctrines and associated 'keystone' texts. Yet, again, this is not done. Is this because they are not seen as relevant or are not needed to formulate or comment on how the land battle should proceed or be planned for? Indeed, is Army's 'hierarchy of doctrine' seen to be the last word on the subject of land warfare and all that is necessary for planning appropriate force structures or designing interesting and informative curricula for military education and training?

A possible indication of why LWD1 takes the line it does is contained in a speech made by the Chief of Army at the National Press Club on 14 April 1999. The speech sets out where Army is heading in the information age and why, and repeats much of what is argued in LWD1. But in a section entitled 'warfighting focus', Hickling notes that there are 'plenty of commentators around the edges of defence who are calling for a variety of reforms, ranging from the use of the ADF as a social engineering laboratory [is this a reference to the recent and, for some, controversial policies on the employment of women and homosexuals in the armed forces?] through to reorganising us as peacekeepers'. He then goes on to say that there should be 'no doubt' that:

> . . . our focus is — and must remain — the delivery of warfighting capabilities that are international best practice. To aim for anything less would be an insult to our people in uniform; and a betrayal of the nation. I have seen the results of a peacekeeping culture in several armies in recent years. Those are not the kind of Army that will earn the respect that is the foundation of successful peacekeeping, and they are not the kind of Army that I want to be part of.

While such a strong and forthright view may be understandable, it is not in keeping with the broader exercise of openly examining, and seeking to respond to, a changing and increasingly complex and turbulent world. Hickling's uncompromising position is also potentially at odds with his call, in LWD1, for vigorous analysis and debate since it is likely to dissuade serving Army officers from expressing a dissenting or alternative view (who is going to risk his or her career by publicly disagreeing with the head of their service?). Read from this perspective, LWD1 is closer to dogma (or discourse) than doctrine. It prescribes how the Army and its officers are to view the world around us, declares that the doctrinal agenda should be limited to the issues of war-fighting and war-winning, and uses the authority of the Chief of Army to justify its contents and arguments. While better than some other military documents, LWD1 also relies more than it needs on jargon and cliches which serve merely to reinforces its sense of dogmatic insistence.

3. LWD1: a doctrine for war or peace?

LWD1 places heavy emphasis on war, war-fighting and war-winning. According to the document, the Army 'exists to fight and win battles'. It needs to be 'structured for war and adapted for peace'. Winning the battle at the tactical level is the land forces' 'primary role'. In peacetime, the Army 'trains to win' in times of war. Its doctrine is informed by 'principles of war'. In order to win it needs to be able to 'fight smart'. And so on. The wars and armed conflicts it has in mind, moreover, are of a particular kind. They involve 'nations' or 'nation-states' and their respective armed forces. They are fought against readily identifiable 'enemies' and 'adversaries' which threaten our own or our friend's national 'objectives', 'interests' or 'identities'. They are 'violent, dangerous and unpredictable', take place in 'hostile environments', involve a fundamental 'clash of wills' between opponents, and are all about 'prevailing' or 'winning'. These notions reflect traditional, realist thinking. We may be moving from the industrial to a post-industrial or information age but warfare and armed conflict continue to be viewed from essentially Hobbsian and Clausewitzian perspectives, perspectives which are located firmly in the (early) modern or industrial era.

The emphasis given to war and traditional means of war-fighting can be criticised on a number of other grounds. First, it doesn't reflect Australia's contemporary experience. Army's doctrine continues to be underpinned by principles of war even though Australia's military forces have not been involved in a major war or armed conflict since 1975. During this time the ADF has been heavily engaged in a range of what are now being called 'operations other than war': peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement, disaster and humanitarian relief operations, counter-terrorism, and so on. By the Defence Department's own admission, the ADF is more likely to be called on to conduct or participate in these kinds of operations in the future, either unilaterally or as part of UN or other multinational forces, than fight a traditional war.

Second, the emphasis given to war-fighting involves a very narrow, and selective, reading of what should constitute Army's doctrinal domain. According to LWD1, military doctrine is defined as the 'fundamental principles by which military forces. . .guide their actions in support of national objectives', or more simply as 'the preferred method for employment of land forces'. This definition makes no mention of war. It is a secular representation of the role of doctrine which can cover both peace and wartime conditions. Yet Army has chosen to focus its analysis on war and makes only passing references to peace. The document does talk about, in a chapter on 'Conflict and War', a future 'spectrum of conflicts' (and associated military operations) which range from 'emergency relief', 'peacekeeping' and 'defence aid to the civil community' at the more peaceful end of the spectrum to tactical and strategic nuclear war at the 'total war' end. It also classifies the land force operations contained within this spectrum into distinctive 'warfighting' and 'military support' operations where each category is said to have a different purpose or 'focus of effort':

> In warfighting, the focus is defeating an adversary by the use or threat of force. In military support operations, the focus is overcoming a problematic environment, be it physical, social or political; the use of force may be required, but it is secondary to the objectives of the operation.

But this categorisation of possible future military roles is not followed through. Any distinctions between the two kinds of operations are summarily dismissed on the grounds that 'from its warfighting capabilities the Army generally has been able to meet the requirements for military support operations'. There is no need, then, for the document to speculate on whether and how military support operations may differ doctrinally from warfighting ones, and LWD1 proceeds accordingly. Nor has the document attempted to discuss which of the identified conflicts or conflict types may be more prevalent in the future — LWD1 does state that the possibility of another global war 'seems remote' but adds that it 'cannot be discounted', and warns that the 'consequences for national security and survival are normally more severe as the spectrum approaches total war' — or has it identified those factors that might inform such a judgement.

Yet there is a growing body of academic and broader opinion, and some supporting evidence,[3] that suggests, first, that the prospect of wars of the kind envisaged by LWD1 may be declining as we move from the industrial to the post-industrial age. Second, the kinds of military conflicts in which the ADF is likely to be involved may be different in significant respects to those that inform LWD1's primary considerations. Third, the principles, approaches and values associated with warfighting and war-winning may not be relevant to, and may even serve to compound, the complex emergencies and other conflicts that increasingly characterise the post-industrial and post-Cold War world. Let me deal with each of these criticisms in turn as part of a more general discussion of: 1) the demise of inter-state war; 2) the 'complex emergencies' and so-called 'new wars' that are appearing in the wake of the end of the Cold War; and 3) the growing incidence of, and demands for, humanitarian interventions by UN or UN-sanctioned forces and its implications.

3.1 The demise of inter-state war

There a growing consensus among national elites of at least developed states that war may be no longer a rational or effective means of pursuing political goals. As John Mueller first argued in 1989,

> The psychic and physical costs of major war (with or without nuclear weapons) have unambiguously become prohibitively high - so high , in fact, that even belligerent methods short of war, such as crisis and military maneuver, have been applied only sparingly (and with declining enthusiasm) in large part because of the fear they might escalate to war.[4]

The decline in the prospects of interstate war is said to be heightened by certain developments which distinguish the present era from earlier ones. These include the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, which changed forever rational war calculations at least among nuclear players, and growing economic interdependence which serves to increase the number of stakeholders in international disputes as well as the potential costs of major military conflict. A further, more contentious, set of factors seen to be aiding peace are the end of the Cold War and the 'triumph' of liberal capitalism, and the continuing spread of a modern, democratised and globalised culture.[5]

The process of globalisation is thought by many to be transforming the existing system of international political order in complex and contentious ways.[6] Emerging alongside the Westphalian world of territorial states is a complex, increasingly interconnected and globalised international political economy which operates in accordance with the premises of market economics, has porous or no borders, and is dominated by a range of non-state entities, norms and transactions.[7] An important feature of this emerging global economy is that it is 'more or less coterminous with the Western alliance system': that group of leading capitalist powers that won the struggle against both fascism and communism.[8] The rise of this kind of 'economic security community' is said to represent one of the defining features of the post-Cold War world which, in contrast to earlier eras, is likely to offset some of the potential hazards seen to be associated with the concurrent shift from a bipolar to a multipolar geopolitical power structure.

The emergence of regional economic communities in Europe and elsewhere has led some scholars to propose a tiered or centre-periphery approach to understanding international relations.[9] This sees the contemporary world not in terms of a collection of autonomous states but broader regions or zones which are differentiated along economic, industrial and political rather than territorial or military lines. Within this schema, the 'centre', 'core', 'first tier' or 'zone of peace' comprises the globally dominant group of capitalist economies - roughly those belonging to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As Donald Snow has argued, these countries are

distinguished by: 1) their 'participation in the global economy'; 2) the fact that they have 'entered the Third or High-Technology Revolution, which is increasingly the driving force behind their economic growth and prosperity'; 3) their demonstrated commitment to democracy; and 4) a broadly shared consensus that conflict, and more specifically war, between them is 'essentially unthinkable'.[10]

The 'periphery' or 'second tier' encompasses the rest of the world and, as such, embraces a vast array of structures and conditions. Because of this, the second tier is sometimes further divided into 'subtiers' such as: relatively advanced economies, which includes countries like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Israel, Argentina and Brazil; partially developed economies, such as China, India, Egypt, Bolivia, and Poland; undeveloped or developable economies and, finally, resource-rich countries. In contrast to the first tier, the second tier is much more fractious and conflict-ridden although most of the conflict is restricted to the least developed states and to 'areas that lie principally outside the growing global economy'.[11] Most countries in the relatively advanced and partially developed tiers are said to aspire to be part of the core and so seek generally to follow the example set by the first tier at least as far as economic policies and prescriptions are concerned. Whether they will (and need to) adopt more open and democratic political structures is less certain and, if the proponents of the democratic peace thesis are correct, could have an important bearing on the prospect of conflict within the core itself in the future and on the future role of military force(s) there. Those who see the next millennium dominated by geoeconomics rather than geopolitics, suggest that the place of both the state and military power in international affairs will become much less relevant although they will continue to have a role. Increasing economic interdependence, the rising power of transnational corporations and the so-called 'triumph' of liberal capitalism raise questions about the importance of sovereignty and territoriality in security calculations. They also hold out the prospect of slowly expanding 'zones of peace' (or democratic economic communities) within which there would be no expectation of major war and no need for either state-based sovereignty defence forces or the maintenance of internal military balances of power.[12] Military forces will still be required in at least the short term for a degree of internal reassurance, to protect those in the 'zones of peace' against threats emerging from the surrounding 'zones of turmoil', and, occasionally, to intervene in these latter areas to safeguard peoples and resources, or to help protect or resurrect failed or failing states or communities (this issue is discussed in more detail below).

Given that the 'zones of peace' will be inhabited by highly advanced, 'third wave' economies that are able to capitalise on the ongoing 'revolution in military affairs', it is unlikely that they will be challenged militarily by the large, but technologically inferior, conventional armies located in the more advanced parts of the 'zones of turmoil'.[13] Rather for 'first tier' countries, the key security issues are likely to be non-military rather than military ones such as population movements, pandemics and trans-boundary environmental pressures. The ascendancy of high-technology western military forces and capabilities, so evident in the Gulf War, may also lead to a change of tactics by those developing states or other organisations that are in conflict with First World or 'first tier' countries. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe in their book *Wars and Anti-Wars*, the adversaries of the developed world will be able to access the increasingly sophisticated weapons and techniques being developed for conventional armed conflict in order to blackmail, threaten or destroy their opponents or competitors. Their case is said be helped by the fact that the continuing revolution in information and associated technologies is also creating enormously sophisticated 'Third Wave' economies that will become more vulnerable to 'ideological, religious, or cultural warriors who roam the planet, and [to] computer "crackers" [who] can turn up in countries like Colombia or Iran, placing their talents at the service of criminals or fanatics'.[14]

The continuing transformation of the system of international political order and the overall decline in the prospects of inter-state war have major implications for Australia. They raise further questions about Australia's current defence posture which seeks to deter and, if necessary, defeat a conventional military attack against the Australian mainland and its offshore territories. They raise questions about the primacy currently given to the strategic and military dimensions of Australia's national security posture. And they require changes to be made to how Australia's military forces generally, and its land forces in particular, should plan to be used in the future. But, as in the case of ASP '97, Army's 'keystone' planning document either

ignores these developments and their potential implications, or it focuses only on those aspects of our changing environment which are relevant to its purposes. Like ASP ’97, LWD1’s treatment of the various determinants of Australia’s military policies and strategies focuses on so-called ‘strategic’ factors: the ‘external strategic environment’, the ‘internal strategic characteristics of the nation-state’, and its ‘historical experience of military strategy and conflict’.[15] This enables the document to proceed to identify Australia’s ‘enduring strategic interests’ in traditional terms — power balancing, systemic stabilisation, maintenance of regional order, and strong defences and alliances — and then devise a response to meet these needs. Within this context, the ADF has to be able to help shape Australia’s emerging strategic environment and, together with its friends and allies, respond to security concerns that might arise in the region and beyond while, at the same time, preparing itself to defend Australia’s own territory and interests. This requires, in turn, an Army that can contribute to ‘manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment’, either around Australia itself or further afield, to contribute to ‘coalition operations worldwide’, and to protect Australian sovereignty against a range of potential threats and sources of insecurity.

While the logic of this position appears compelling, it is also disingenuous. As we have seen, LWD’s analysis is based on a particular and, I would argue, questionable reading of Australia’s emerging security environment, one which: ignores the multidimensional and multisectoral nature of security; downplays the important interconnections between the strategic and other dimensions of security; and continues unduly to privilege the security of the state in its analysis of world affairs.[16] The discussion of Australia’s changing external environment effectively discounts the processes of globalisation and regionalisation and, in so doing, ignores other possible ‘strategic futures’ and their potential consequences for the role of military force in international affairs generally and the ADF in particular.

Yet, as we have seen, in an increasingly globalised world the role of military force(s) is likely to broaden beyond the defence of national sovereignty. National security concerns will be complemented by human and global interests. Traditional alliances will be gradually replaced by common security arrangements. Society will become progressively interconnected and demilitarised. Military forces will be increasingly collectively organised and will tend to be employed more and more in global security rather than national defence roles. These ‘new’ roles will include the management of planetary resources, the policing of UN or other global norms and conventions, and the provision and maintenance of infrastructural and other forms of support to areas or regions of need.[17] To the extent they are addressed at all, these kinds of issues, and their implications, are considered only peripherally by LWD1.

It could be argued that these kinds of issues are outside Army’s expertise and responsibility. They relate more to national decision making than to the preparation of land warfare doctrine. Only the government and its key advisers can, and should, decide whether and how Australia’s armed forces should be used and structured in the future. Army planners merely respond to, and elaborate on the land warfare elements of these broader decisions, and use the doctrine contained in LWD1 to inform their decisions accordingly. This is in itself a very limited interpretation of how policy is, or should be, made especially at the strategic level. Army planners and commanders are required to carry out the orders and directions of their superiors. But we would expect them also to be actively involved in the processes that inform these decisions, querying assumptions where it is needed, providing up-to-date and relevant advice, discussing and debating contending options, assessing their implications, and so on. One role of doctrinal documents like LWD1 is to provide a coherent and intellectually sustainable basis for such activities and dialogue. The current document does not do this, preferring instead to insist on a particular way of doing things and repeating without sufficient thought and reflection traditional war-fighting mantras and myths.

3.2 Post-Cold War ‘complex emergencies’ and ‘uncivil wars’

The decline in the prospect of war between industrialised nations does not mean that armed and other forms of conflict will disappear completely for the foreseeable future at least. This was recognised by Mueller and is the central message in Martin van Creveld’s study, *The Transformation of War*.[18] According to van Creveld and others, wars in the next century are more likely to take place not on traditional battle fields but in more complex environments, largely

within society rather than between bordered states. As such, acts of aggression will be aimed less at national armed forces and more at political leaders and their families, at property both private and public, and at segments of the population. In many of these places, traditional armed forces will be supplemented with, or replaced by, different types of warmaking structures, organised not around governments but local communities, criminal organisations of various kinds, and charismatic leaders.[19] These various 'post-Fordist' militaries may not have cruise missiles and the other high-technology weapons that are owned by developed world forces, but they will be able easily to access the range of small arms that have flooded the world in the wake of the end of the Cold War.[20] They are likely, too, to benefit from what Mary Kaldor and her colleagues have described as the increasing 'informalization' of the international arms trade: a process whereby

> . . . surplus weapons from the arsenals of the rich countries are sold "downstream" to Third World governments or newly independent states in the Balkans or the former Soviet Union. Redundant soldiers sell their weapons or services for hard currency. Weapons scientists sell their knowledge to outlawed governments. Obsolete bases or stores are raided by black marketeers. Often, illegal small-scale craftsmen copy light weapons to arm informal groups.[21]

The roots of future crises and conflicts are also said to be shifting away from struggles over states' interests towards more traditional concerns with injustice, vainglory, religion and ethnic differences. Indeed, ethno-nationalism and ethnic violence within states are seen by many as the principal source and type of conflict respectively in the post-Cold War era.[22] These 'uncivil wars' as Donald Snow has called them, are said to differ from their predecessors in a number of important ways.[23] They tend to take place largely in relatively remote regions on the periphery of the developed world. They usually have little relevance much beyond the immediate vicinity of the site of the violence — unless they are taken up by the international media — and, as we have witnessed in the case of the Balkans, are extremely difficult to manage from outside. They arise in the wake of the disintegration of existing states, the destruction or marginalisation of local economies, and the break-down in the state's traditional monopoly over organised violence. They are more about the politics of identity than traditional concerns with *realpolitik* and so make little sense from either traditional Clausewitzian or Cold War (counter)revolutionary perspectives. They are marked by a decline in earlier patron-client state relations and the emergence of a range of new external connections and actors including various diaspora communities, transnational commercial networks (both legally and illegally-based), foreign mercenaries, and NGOs. And they have to be understood within the context of increasing globalisation and fragmentation. We are witnessing, in short, a blurring of the previous distinctions between peacetime and wartime, between military and criminal activities, between state and non-state actors and interests, and between the local and the global.

Thus ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict can be seen as a manifestation of a broader process of desegregation of, and dissatisfaction with, traditional political structures and sources of authority. As Martin Shaw has argued, the final years of the twentieth-century are witnessing a range of competing claims to identity based not just on ethnicity but religion, gender, race, class, profession, lifestyle and other grounds.[24] Increasing social fragmentation is being driven by the globalisation which is affecting everywhere and in fundamental ways existing economic, political, organisational and social structures.[25] Globalisation is serving, for example, to broaden the gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots' within society while, making these difference more apparent via an increasingly intrusive media. It may also be serving to replace the existing class structure with a new form of socio-economic stratification informed, on the one hand, by an emerging cosmopolitanism and, on the other, by the 'politics of particularism'. This embraces a range of local identities and causes, has links which transcend national boundaries, and can be seen, in part, as the source of local resistance or opposition to the forces of globalisation and its agents (including, in many instances, the state and its armed forces).

The post-Cold War period has not only witnessed a rise in concern over ethnonationalism, failed states and cyber terrorism. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, a whole range of other potential sources of conflict and war have entered the imaginations (and planning spaces) of policymakers and their advisers in the West in particular. The answer to the perennial question '*security from what?*' has been expanded beyond other states or quasi-states and their military

forces, to include a range of 'new' potential pressures or so-called 'threats without enemies'.[26] These new concerns include disputes over the control of, and access to, resources, leading to the prospect of 'water wars', and oil and other energy crises, conflicts and interventions. They also involve various non-military threats to societal harmony and well-being posed by such things as terrorism, drugs, transboundary crime, epidemics and disease, and population movements caused by poverty and overcrowding, political instability, and growing environmental degradation.[27] These various post-Cold War concerns have been encapsulated in terms like 'economic security', 'energy security', 'food security', 'societal security' and 'environmental security'.

These latter sources of insecurity and conflict are not easily dealt with by traditional military means or forces. They require approaches which emphasise cooperation above competition, conflict resolution over war-fighting, and common rather than state security. The various developments and concerns described above have also led a number of authors to highlight growing discrepancies between the existing and anticipated roles and functions of armed forces within the developed world. Martin van Creveld and others believe that traditional, Clausewitzian strategies and structures will be of little use for either understanding or responding to the situations governments and their leaders will face in the future.[28] Donald Snow suggests that the high-technology weapons and forces flowing from the 'revolution in military affairs' may not be particularly relevant or appropriate for most of the conflicts likely to be faced by the United States and its allies in the future.[29] While high-technology forces might be needed for defence against an attack by a major second tier power, such an eventuality is thought to be unlikely given, first, that most advanced second tier states are seeking to become part of the core, and second, the clear and growing technological ascendancy of first tier forces and economies.

Carl Builder of the RAND Corporation similarly argues that, in light of the systemic changes taking place in the world, the size of active forces required for war-fighting roles will almost certainly decrease, whereas missions and associated forces 'involving the rapid projection of infrastructure (transport, communications, surveillance, rescue, medical, humanitarian assistance, civil emergency, and security) are likely to increase disproportionately'.[30] Alvin and Heidi Toffler see an increasing need for special forces or special operations units to deal with low-intensity conflicts — defined as 'hostilities constituting limited war but short of a conventional or general war' — as well as conduct such missions as 'feeding villagers after a disaster', clandestine raids for intelligence gathering, sabotage, hostage rescue, assassination and 'anti-terrorist or anti-narco operations'.[31] They further argue that western militaries need to become smarter and more attuned to both the problems and possibilities of 'Third Wave' civilisation and warfare: to mobilise the almost limitless potential of the silicon chip and interactive software to not only enhance existing weapons systems but to develop a new and perhaps more appropriate (and effective) range of non-lethal and other technologies; to extend their own protection against computer viruses, 'info-terrorists', 'have-gun-will-travel fanatics' and other postmodern threats; and to develop a 'brain' rather than 'brawn' based structure and corporate ethos within the armed forces themselves.

First World militaries and their advisers have begun to respond to some of these new agendas and concerns. In recent years, academic and the professional journals of the United States' and other armed forces have contained articles on new forms of insecurity, the prospect of asymmetric warfare, the role of military forces in resource management and protection, and so on.[32] Major studies have been initiated to try and forecast alternative 'strategic futures' and their implications for militaries. Conferences have been run or sponsored on such topics as 'disaster relief', 'environmental security', 'defence and the environment', and 'new era security'.[33] Many military forces, including those in Australia, are becoming more responsive to environmental and other non-military expectations and norms. We are seeing the progressive 'greening' of military forces and policies including, in the latter case, more energy efficient resource usage, the protection and conservation of military sites, the clean-up of military pollution including unexpended ordinance and land-mines, and, even, the development of more environmentally benign weapons and operational doctrines.[34] Existing military strategies and doctrines are also beginning to be extended beyond traditional war-fighting concepts and techniques to encompass such things as peacekeeping, conflict resolution and 'operations other than war'.[35] Military forces are becoming involved more in monitoring the environment either directly or in concert with other

government or international agencies. They are being encouraged to intervene in the affairs of (largely developed world) states not only, as discussed in detail shortly, to respond to humanitarian concerns or conflicts arising from environmental or resource pressures, but to maintain control over vital resources or to prevent the continuing depletion of non-sustainable resources or environmental assets, or to prevent the proliferation of non-conventional weapons and capabilities.

The Australian Army's insistence on developing doctrine only for traditional wartime operations and war-fighting roles contradicts what is being thought about and done in other places (it also fails to acknowledge Australia's own recent experiences). While Army, and Australia's defence policy makers on Russell Hill, talk of the expansion of security beyond traditional politico-military-strategic concerns, they continue to view, and respond to, these 'new' threats to Australia's security in largely traditional and Cold War terms: as 'dangers located in an external and anarchic environment which threaten the security of an internal and domestic society, often via recourse to violence'.[36] Such thinking belongs to the past. It is increasingly inappropriate for examining or understanding many of the insecurities of a globalising world. Nor is it particularly useful for divining either conceptual or policy responses to the problems we are now facing. LWD1's portrayal of wars and warfighting also sits uncomfortably with the 'complex emergencies' and 'new' or 'uncivil' wars we see today in places like the Balkans, East Timor, Rwanda and Transcaucasia. As a minimum, the document needs to: 1) acknowledge and try to characterise these new forms of crisis and conflict; 2) use these to spell out more the conceptual and other differences between warfighting and military (or peace) support operations; 3) use this typology to inform subsequent discussions of how Australian land force commanders, units and personnel might go about preparing themselves for, and operating within, these new and complex environments.

Beyond these doctrinal considerations is the broader issue of what should be the focus of Australian land forces in the 21st century. The current approach, described in Chapter 2 of LWD1, is to try and maintain a force structure which provides 'the government with the most appropriate mix of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict relevant to Australia's strategic circumstances'. This is best achieved, the document continues, by structuring for the higher levels of possible threat and using these forces to meet lower level contingencies as they arise, in the current jargon: by 'structuring for war and adapting for peace'. In view of the changes in Australia's strategic circumstances described above, the increasing cost of staying at the leading edge of military technology, the continuing competition for resources among the services, and the (reasonable) likelihood that the overall level of expenditure on defence in Australia is unlikely to be increased for some time to come, it may be time to adopt an alternative and more cost-effective approach to structuring and preparing the ADF's ground force component. Options here could include: structuring separate elements of the Army for war and peace, focusing on developing 'niche' forces and capabilities for specific roles, or reversing the current planning axiom altogether by 'structuring for peace operations and adapting for war'. I will return to this issue after discussing the issue of humanitarian intervention and the emergence of 'new' forms of peacekeeping.

3.3 Humanitarian intervention and new forms of peacekeeping

In contrast to the period that preceded it, the post-Cold War era has also witnessed a significant number of UN-sponsored or sanctioned military interventions that have been motivated, in theory if not in practice, by humanitarian considerations. The number of states and other actors — such as NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States — participating in, sponsoring, or organising such operations has increased.[37] And the meaning of peacekeeping itself is being expanded beyond earlier understandings to embrace so-called 'second-generation' or 'wider peacekeeping' activities which includes the option of peace enforcement.[38]

This trend has not been without its problems, dilemmas and controversies. The complexities surrounding the issue of humanitarian intervention has tended to predispose decisionmakers — and their military advisers — either to 'do nothing' or the minimum necessary to avoid embarrassing failures and any potential political costs that might arise from their actions. Yet national decision makers are also under intense pressure from their publics and increasingly powerful social movements to 'do something' to alleviate the misery and suffering that is paraded before

them on a daily basis by CNN and other international media outlets. As demonstrated by the United States' experience in Somalia, however, public support (including that of Congress and other influential domestic actors) for a particular intervention can also quickly deteriorate in the face of mounting casualties or ongoing destruction and suffering. This growing popular aversion to war and battle casualties in western countries at least, is an important characteristic of the post-industrial age.[39] It has led governments to try and limit the nature and scope of their military involvement — to rely more on the use air power, for example, or to withdraw forces once certain limited objectives have been achieved — and to subject the interventions that do take place to increasingly restrictive operational guidelines and rules of engagement.

Some commentators lament that this reluctance to sanction the use of military forces, or to use them only sparingly, is occurring at a time when the release of earlier Cold War constraints is fomenting the spread of 'a new, much less restrained culture of war' which, if allowed to proceed unchecked, could serve to undermine international peace and stability.[40] Others worry that it may lessen the chance of successfully resolving humanitarian crises and, in the light of population displacement, ethnic cleansing and other problems re-emerging after the peacekeepers return home, serve to increase the propensity not to intervene in the first place.[41]

The view that military force(s) should be deployed only for short periods of time or to achieve only limited operational objectives also ignores the complex and interconnected nature of the post-Cold war security environment. If it is to be involved at all in humanitarian operations, the military will in many cases need to be engaged for extended periods of time. Rather than stabilising the military situation and then withdrawing, military forces will need to become the 'security guarantors' for the whole process of civil reconciliation and reconstruction in the affected areas, helping provide the time and space for a return to normalcy and 'encouraging and maintaining an environment in which each phase of post-conflict restoration can continue'.[42] This requires, in turn, a more holistic and longer-term planning perspective than is presently allowed by political and military leaders alike, one which recognises that military action is part of a much broader process, and accepts that other non-state actors and agencies have equally important roles to play in the management of complex emergencies and their aftermath. As Trevor Findlay has nicely put it,

> The holding operation of yesteryear has been superseded by the multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace process. Where peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling the root causes of armed conflict in favour of containment and de-escalation, they are now mandated to seek just and lasting solutions.[43]

This broader and more comprehensive role involves an expanding repertoire of tasks, functions, capabilities and skills. Whereas in the past, intervening forces would be primarily involved in supervising and monitoring cease-fire agreements, they may now be required, among other things, to provide humanitarian assistance of various kinds, manage the movement of refugees and displaced persons, help conduct elections, provide safe havens and protection for humanitarian workers, establish cantonment areas or demilitarised zones between warring parties, disarm military or paramilitary forces, clear mines and other leftovers from war, provide civil administration, maintain law and order, negotiate local cease-fires or the safe passage of aid, provide for noncombatant evacuation, contribute to the reconstruction and development of local economies, and assist in the reestablishment of civil society. As we have seen in the Balkans and elsewhere, many of these tasks need to be conducted in the midst of ongoing armed conflicts, without the consent of some or all of the parties involved, within the glare of international media, and in the face of ongoing hostility abroad and indifference at home. None of these issues and their potential implications for how military forces should be prepared and used are addressed in any detail by LWD1.[44]

According to LWD1, 'peacekeeping' and 'peace enforcement' (covering military sanctions and military enforcement operations and techniques) are components of the broader category of 'peace operations' which, together with 'support operations' comprise what are termed 'military support operations'. As described earlier, 'military support operations' are seen to differ from 'warfighting operations' in that they focus on 'overcoming a problematic environment' whereas warfighting involves 'defeating an adversary'. LWD1 goes on to state that warfighting and military support operations can 'occur in combination or discretely' and that so-

called 'security operations' — which are categorised as warfighting operations and include protection operations, aid to law enforcement, counterterrorism, evacuation operations and counterinsurgency — can be mounted during peace operations.

Having gone to the trouble of categorising the various operations and tasks land force units may be called on to perform, LWD1 provides little detail on what each type of operation involves and how they may differ in conceptual, doctrinal and practical terms. Yet, as argued earlier, the different objectives of warfighting and military support operations would seem to require quite different approaches, skills, structures and training regimes. Similar differences might also distinguish 'security' from 'defensive' and 'offensive' warfighting operations, and 'peacekeeping' from 'peace enforcement'. Taking the last case as an example, traditional peacekeeping practice assumes that the operational environment will be relatively benign. Intervening military forces are generally present with the consent of the warring parties and in accordance with a negotiated settlement of some kind. As a consequence they can be thinly dispersed, lightly armed and protected, and relatively poorly trained. They will have quite narrowly defined roles, little need for extensive and expensive logistics or intelligence collection capabilities, and only minimal contact with civilian and other agencies operating in the area.

This traditional approach is neither appropriate nor viable in many of today's complex emergencies and civil wars where state governments and infrastructure have collapsed, consent for the presence of intervening forces is often limited, ephemeral or non-existent, and, as we have seen, the expected tasks and functions of military forces have widened considerably. These changing circumstances and associated requirements have started to be recognised by some western military forces in particular which have begun to adjust their military policies and training regimes to reflect the needs of 'multifunctional' or 'extended' peacekeeping operations.[45] Yet important doctrinal differences remain especially over the efficacy of force and the approach to non-compliance. Some, such as the Nordic countries and Great Britain, continue to insist on maintaining a clear separation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to this view, peacekeeping must continue to be premised on the consent of the warring parties, the impartiality of the intervening forces, and the limited use of force (usually for self-defence only although what is meant by this term has expanded beyond the defence of the individual peacekeeper to include units, areas and, more contentiously, mandates). Although conducted by more robust forces than previously, post-Cold War peacekeeping continues to proceed around the processes of negotiation, conflict resolution and consensus-building, and the forces involved have either no or only a limited capacity for conducting offensive operations. As in the past, this lack of an offensive capability is seen to facilitate the peacemaking process because it reassures the parties that the UN cannot take sides or force them to adopt unwanted solutions.

Others, such as the French and, to a lesser extent, the United States, argue that there will inevitably be some overlap between traditional peacekeeping and 'more ambitious' or enforcement operations in the post-Cold War era (producing 'grey area' operations or a 'middle option' which is often designated as 'peace enforcement'). In their view the experience in Bosnia and elsewhere shows that the military capacity of intervening forces needs to be extended beyond self-defence to include the ability, where needed, to compel compliance at least at the tactical and operational levels. Under this approach, the intervening forces would be relatively heavily armed and 'actively impartial'. They would seek to 'shape consent' not only by acting as traditional peacekeepers but also by

> . . . pressuring the parties, intimidating them, if necessary, by subjecting them to exemplary pre-emptive self-defense or to a limited coercive campaign against carefully-selected military targets. Thus, military credibility is to peace enforcement what intrinsic military weakness is to peacekeeping. This means fielding a force ready for war or at least capable enough to deter a party that would resist by harming UN troops or other international personnel.[46]

The debates over whether or not to include an enforcement option in peace operations rehearse, in many ways, those over military intervention generally (as well as offensive versus defensive military postures).[47] Those who support the proposal argue that today's circumstances make it both impossible and inadvisable to try and distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement especially at the tactical and operational levels. In their view a limited enforcement capability is often needed to perform properly the various 'new' tasks and functions being

allocated to contemporary peacekeeping forces. The evident capacity to engage in offensive military operations, moreover, can serve to dissuade dissident groups from attacking others and therefore more readily secure cooperation and facilitate a peaceful reconciliation.

Opponents of peace enforcement argue that it will undermine the impartiality of the UN and further stretch its already limited resources, place military peacekeepers and civilian aid workers at risk, make it more difficult to negotiate local cease-fires or political settlements, inevitably force the UN or its representatives either to increase its offensive operations or, as the conflict worsens, to withdraw (thereby further reducing its credibility within the international community), dissuade member states from participating in peace operations, and give encouragement to the (flawed) notion that complex social and political problems can be solved quickly through military means. The two positions will complicate existing moves to rationalise peacekeeping doctrines and processes. As witnessed in Somalia and Bosnia, they could also to have serious consequences for the conduct of multilateral peace operations — by generating conflicts of interests and approach and producing incoherent or inappropriate responses to tactical developments for example — and, in the extreme, serve to undermine the effectiveness or success of the operation as a whole.

As with the arguments for and against intervention, the issue of peace enforcement is both highly complex and difficult to reconcile satisfactorily. Most of the arguments described above are sustainable in theory and can be supported by examples drawn from the field. While it may be possible to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement conceptually, it is much more difficult to do so in practice. Given the complex and changing nature of post-Cold War conflicts and crises, there will always be situations when peacekeepers will be required to act as enforcers and vice versa. That said, the two approaches continue to be based on different and potentially conflicting premises and values, they follow divergent operational strategies, have different (albeit overlapping) rules of engagement, and, more contentiously perhaps, require different force structures and processes of command and control. The use of peacekeepers or peace enforcers for the wrong reasons or in the wrong circumstances can have disastrous results not only for those directly involved but for the prospects of peace and security within the area of operations or even more generally.

The outcome of these differences and debates is likely to be that post-Cold War peacekeeping operations — which will be more 'muscular' than their predecessors and involve a much wider repertoire of tasks and functions — will continue to be conducted largely by traditional UN contingents of state-based forces that have been organised, trained and equipped especially for these roles and are provided as part of the UN's Standby Arrangement System (SBAS).[48] Peace enforcement operations will be largely subcontracted by the UN to those regional organisations, 'coalitions of the willing' and even individual states which have both the capabilities and the political will to conduct what are wars or quasi-wars.[49] As has been the case in the Balkans, these operations may occur in tandem or independently and, together, will require considerable personnel and resources. In deciding which type(s) of operation it will focus on in the future — multifunctional peacekeeping or peace enforcement or both or neither of these — Army needs to keep in mind not only the different purposes and doctrinal requirements of each kind of operation, but that future peace enforcement operations are likely primarily to involve air and maritime strike forces whereas peacekeeping operations will be conducted largely by ground forces. LWD1's continuing insistence on only using Australia's land forces in war fighting roles may see the end of the Army as we currently know it.

Another issue that Army and LWD1 needs to come to terms with concerns the question of whether forces developed and maintained for the defence of the state are the most appropriate for carrying out international peacekeeping operations? Do we need to change the ways national forces are structured, equipped, trained, led and motivated and, if so, in what ways? There is a general belief among national political and military leaders, including as we have seen those in Australia, that state-based self-defence forces, equipped with battle-winning capabilities and trained for conventional war-fighting roles, can and should be used to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Such forces can be dispatched overseas at relatively short notice, are administratively self-sufficient, and are able to deal with the kinds of threats that characterise post-Cold War 'complex emergencies'. Forces configured for defending state borders and interests can also readily engage in peace enforcement actions if and when the need arises. Proponents of this view add that

while forces capable of defending the state against high-level military threats can be used in various peacekeeping roles, peacekeeping forces cannot be used to defend the state against any significant level of threat. To structure a state's military forces for international peace operations risks the security of the state.

While there is some merit in these views, it needs to be kept in mind that they may be motivated as much by a desire on the part of national political and military elites to retain favoured or desired weapons systems as any rational assessment of what may be best for the tasks at hand.[50] The assertion that conventional armies are the best for conducting non-conventional operations needs to recognise that forces deployed on peace operations still require a period of specialised training before they can be used effectively (and re-training when they are finished) and may need to be provided with additional equipments and capabilities (such as air and ground transport assets, medical facilities and civilian liaison teams). As Colin McInnes has argued in the British case, the policy encourages the maintenance of 'balanced' forces — those capable of meeting every foreseen contingency — which can be both very costly and inefficient.[51] The assertion that forces configured for peace operations cannot defend the state also ignores the changing nature of in/security in an increasingly globalised world. As described above, for many countries today, including Australia, the principal threats to national security are largely non-military in nature — uncontrolled population movements, drug-running, environmental degradation, and so on — and need to be dealt with using security forces and strategies (broadly defined) rather than traditional defence forces.

There is evidence, too, that traditional military structures, capabilities, procedures and mindsets are not always or entirely appropriate for contemporary peace and security operations and so need to be adjusted or changed in some areas. Michael Dziedzic notes, for example, that internationally sanctioned peace missions are usually required to establish a stable and secure domestic environment where 'particular attention must be given to coaxing indigenous institutions of law and order into functioning in rough accordance with internationally acceptable standards', and members of the mission will be called upon to conduct a variety of policing roles such as training and mentoring local police cadres, mediating domestic disputes, and maintaining public order. While such activities would normally be the responsibility of international civil police (CIVPOL) contingents, in at least the early stages of an intervention they will have to be carried out by military forces.[52] Even when CIVPOL are present, they may well require continuing military support to deal with serious challenges to law and order, posed by criminal organisations or heavily armed gangs for example, or to implement certain provisions of any peace agreement (disarming factions, handling more violent forms of opposition to political reform, etc).

The problem here, Dziedzic continues, is that '[m]ilitary forces are reluctant to engage in confrontations with civilians because, with the exception of constabulary units, they are generally not trained in the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict'.[53] The answer, in his view, is to include more constabulary forces — such as the French gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia and the Italian carabinerie — and civil affairs police specialists in the initial military contingents, and provide for continuing liaison and 'mutually reinforcing operations' between military civil affairs and CIVPOL elements (the latter would include common communications and logistics, shared command posts, intermingling of personnel in the field, and so on).

A further problem is that many state-based military forces, in the west at least, are developed and maintained to fight wars at the highest end of the conflict spectrum. Their commanders are trained to command their forces under wartime conditions and so will inevitably approach peace operations in the same way. While success in peace and war can depend on similar processes and attributes — cohesive strategic planning, clear lines of command, integrated approaches to resource usage, and so on — the basic differences, described earlier, between the processes and objectives of war-fighting and peace-restoration/building are too great to be ignored or subsumed within a single force or operational doctrine. These differences may be least in the case of peace enforcement operations, although they continue to exist, but grow proportionately as we move towards the peacekeeping end of the spectrum.

More fundamentally still, the basic value structures of state-based militaries often sit uncomfortably with those that should inspire international humanitarian operations. As we have seen in the Australian case,

military forces and personnel are traditionally concerned with securing the state and its interests against external, largely military threats and enemies. As Kinloch and others have argued, soldiers involved in humanitarian interventions need to be primarily motivated by human rather than state security concerns. They

> ... do not have their source [of motivation] in nationalist, or even religious convictions that hitherto inspired — or were at least canalized — by state or church. They are based [instead] on human values, a personal belief in the universality of the human being however foreign and remote.[54]

In much of their work, military peacekeepers and peacemakers need to be more akin to members of volunteer and non-governmental organisations than to members of traditional military organisations, and be motivated more by humanitarian concerns and beliefs than by national myths or interests.

The idea that the soldiery of the twenty-first century should be motivated more by cosmopolitan than by national values and perspectives echoes the arguments advanced by peace researchers and others who see conflict prevention and peacekeeping as being both more important and more likely roles for the military in the future than defence or deterrence. Mary Kaldor and her colleagues suggest, for example, that traditional military mindsets and structures may not be the most appropriate for dealing with the so-called 'new wars' in the Balkans and elsewhere. In their view, completely new approaches and thinking are required if the tragedies taking place in those parts of the world are to halted. Part of this new approach should be to replace traditional military responses with the concept of cosmopolitan law-enforcement. This would require:

> considerable rethinking about tactics, equipment and, above all, command and training. The kind of equipment required [for cosmopolitan law enforcement operations] is generally cheaper than that which national armed forces order for imagined Clausewitzian wars in the future. Transportation, especially air and sealift, is very important, as are efficient communications. Much of this equipment can be bought or rented from civilian sources. . . . While tactical air support and, indeed, air superiority may prove to be the decisive advantage of multilateral peacekeeping forces in controlling violence, the utility of large-scale sophisticated air strikes is limited in relation to its disadvantages — collateral civilian damage, difficulty of hitting hidden targets, lack of control on the ground . . . Above all, the motivations of these new forces have to be incorporated into a wider concept of cosmopolitan right. Whereas the soldier, as the legitimate bearer of arms, had to be prepared to die for his country, the international soldier/policeman risks his or her life for humanity.[55]

If the Australian Government and the Australian Army are serious about contributing to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, then they will need to take more seriously than they do at present the conceptual and other differences between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and warfighting. There is a strong case for Australia to follow the practice of Canada and some of the Nordic countries and begin to structure and prepare at least some of our ground forces and Army personnel for multifunctional peacekeeping (and security) roles and tasks. As I have argued elsewhere, this could involve making one of the Army's existing brigade groups responsible for developing and maintaining Australia's peacekeeping capabilities, doctrine and expertise.[56] In addition to including regular service personnel who have served in past peacekeeping operations, the brigade could be opened to civilian volunteers who wish specifically to participate in humanitarian and other peace operations. This would not only release other regular soldiers for more traditional military roles but would imbue the force with the kinds of cosmopolitan values needed for the tasks at hand.

Such a proposal would, of course, be resisted by those in the Army and beyond who have emotional or other attachments to the notions of warriors and war-fighting. Any move in this direction is likely to be compounded by the fact that, in a globalising world, many countries and their leaders are seeking to exploit their military forces and military myths to assert or demonstrate their continuing national sovereignty and independence. In this regard, it may be no accident that the drafters of LWD1, like those of ASP 97, have chosen to highlight the special place of Australia's armed forces in the country's history and consciousness. The Australian Army's ethos is said to 'based on the ANZAC tradition of mateship' which has been 'forged repeatedly. . .in battle and sustained in our approach to soldiering'. The ANZAC traditions of loyalty and 'courage under extreme hardship and danger, a fierce spirit of

independence, and the willing sharing of burdens and blessings among mates' are said to underpin the moral component of the Army's fighting power and its prowess which is described by the term 'battle-cunning'. Battle cunning 'is the use of initiative to best adapt to, and take advantage of, the prevailing circumstances'. It is said to be 'rare in other military forces in the world' and its importance is 'demonstrated in the ANZAC withdrawal from Gallipoli, in the Army's prowess and world renown for jungle operations and ambushing, and in the innovative tactical enhancements evident in the Army's current restructuring trials'.

This is pure myth-making which, while suspect intellectually and questionable in fact,[57] adds to the pressure not to move away from traditional war-fighting structures and roles. It tends to enhance the impression that LWD1 is more an expression of dogma than doctrine.

4. The principles of which war?

Underpinning Army's doctrine are ten 'principles or war' which are said to be recognised by the ADF and comprise: selection and maintenance of the aim, concentration of force, cooperation, economy of effort, security, offensive action, surprise, flexibility, sustainment and morale. While many of these principles remain applicable to the 'new wars' that are likely to dominate the coming security landscape, others are either no longer applicable or will need to be revised or replaced by other more relevant principles or considerations. Just as doctrine is expected to evolve in response to political, strategic and other systemic changes, so too must the principles on which doctrine is based.

One such consideration is the growing popular aversion, described earlier, to war and battle casualties. This is having a major impact on whether and under what conditions developed world military forces will be deployed in the future, and on the kinds of operational concepts, strategies and tactics that are able to be used on the ground. Fear of casualties has meant that contemporary war-fighting strategies are placing much greater emphasis than previously on 'stand-off' weapons systems and associated air and maritime capabilities. As Edward Luttwak has argued, it might also force the United States (and its allies) to move towards a 'post-Napoleonic and post-Clausewitzian concept of war' which borrows from eighteenth-century experiences and norms. In addition to casualty avoidance, these would invoke greater use of various non-military instruments and policies — such as trade embargoes and armed blockades — and place much less emphasis on the Napoleonic dictates of tempo, momentum and concentration of force. In the twenty-first century, Luttwak concludes, political and military leaders require 'not only a patient disposition, but also a modest one, so as to admit the desirability of partial results when to do more would be too costly in US lives, and to do nothing , too damaging to our self-respect and to world order'.[58]

A similar position is taken, albeit for slightly different reasons, by Gustav Daniker. In his essay on *The Guardian Soldier*, the former Major General in the Swiss Army suggests that the military's primary missions are now to promote peace and to facilitate the current transition from an era of confrontation to one of cooperation. Military forces are 'no longer solely an instrument of countering enemy power, but increasingly an instrument for building and cementing a new era of inter-state relations'.[59] This requires, in his view, a 'paradigmatic shift' in strategic and defence thinking. Daniker's own ideas on what such a shift should entail are contained in his 'seven theses' governing the future use of military force(s). These include, first, the view that, in a post-Cold War era, the traditional deterrent and combat functions of armed forces will be less important than war prevention, intervention and defence. Second, military victory will become a tactical goal, sublimated to the broader strategic purpose of creating 'favourable conditions for new, more comprehensible and durable peace settlements' between the combatants.[60] As such, the ultimate goal of military doctrine is reconciliation, and combat plans must endeavour to minimise not only friendly force casualties but those of the adversary as well. Third, existing military roles and structures must also be expanded to meet the new times, and provide for much greater flexibility and multifunctionality than previously. The latter requirement cannot, in Daniker's opinion, be improvised but must be included in the military's force structure calculations and its training and equipment schedules. Daniker justified this position by arguing that:

> In a contingency, combat troops can carry out aid missions, but technical or logistics units would be better qualified. It would be even better to train in advance for such missions. Armed forces which will be

> equally well prepared for combat, protection, aid and rescue missions - apart from a certain degree of specialization which is indispensable - will be best suited to measure up to the variety of challenges which may arise. Even in the past, armed forces had to comply, for different non-military reasons, with various and costly regulations which were sometimes contrary to their combat missions. Therefore it should be possible in the future, in the light of clear requirements, to develop organisational patterns, operational principles and equipment for a multiple employment of modern armed forces.[61]

As we have seen, this last view is not shared by Army's planners who continue to insist that it is easier for forces that have been developed for modern conventional warfare and equipped with battle-winning capabilities to be used in low-intensity and non-combat operations than to adopt the multifunctional strategy advocated by Daniker. Nor are they particularly open to his further 'thesis' that 'in the 21st century, the soldier's mission will be to protect, to help and to rescue. His guidelines will be an increasingly purpose-oriented and effective contribution to the maintenance and the restoration of peace, and to the task of securing a life worth living for all nations'.[62]

In its chapter on 'Modern Land Warfare', LWD1 examines the impact of 'the changing nature of the international system and the continuing Revolution in Military Affairs' on modern land warfare. The changes in the international system that are discussed include globalisation, ethnic strife, the emergence of non-state actors, population growth, environmental degradation and the role of the media. While these are important issues, they tend to be dealt with relatively superficially and selectively. Globalisation, for example, is seen as a largely economic phenomenon. The analysis tends to emphasise the various forces of fragmentation and ignores or downplays the concurrent trends towards increased regionalism, international regime-building and the spread of global norms. The current debates, described earlier, over the future likelihood and nature of war are discussed only briefly. The document does state that 'global war or war between major powers is unlikely in the short to medium term' and that there will continue to be 'periods of tension, crisis and conflict at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict [which] will significantly influence the range of tasks in terms of warfighting and military support operations'.

These tasks are neither described nor analysed doctrinally, yet LWD1 proceeds to draw a number of conclusions about what Army will require to 'meet the challenges of modern conflict'. These include 'an approach to warfare that retains close combat as its main focus', the exploitation of the RMA, continuing force modernisation and the harnessing of advances in modern technology, 'improved target acquisition and greater precision, range, lethality and proportionality in firepower', 'increased manoeuvre capability by sea, air and land', and 'enhanced C4ISR and IO capabilities'. While the document does foresee increased civil-military interaction and integration and a need for service personnel to operate more effectively with the media, the bulk of its conclusions relate to improving the Army's conventional warfighting role and its capacity to operate within an increasingly dynamic and technology-dominated 'battlespace'. While such an approach may be reasonable in its own terms — the RMA is, after all, having a significant impact on the way modern warfare is able to be conducted — it assumes that nothing else will change. LWD1's goal of being able to 'fight and win the next war' can be achieved simply by making the most of continuing advances in technology or, in LWD1's words, by 'continuous improvement through modernisation'.

The basic problem with this view is that, as we have already seen, the same forces that are contributing to the so-called revolution in military affairs are serving also to fundamentally alter the broader political, social, strategic, environmental and other contexts in which military force(s) will operate. We are, in short, on the threshold of a new era in international politics. Our sense of changing times is reflected in the momentous events that followed in the wake of the end of the Cold War, events like the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the admission of former eastern European countries into NATO. It is being heightened by suggestions that we have reached the 'end of history' or the 'end of geography',[63] and by the variety of terms being used to try and encapsulate the essence of the on-going transition: post-industrialism or post-Fordism, post-militarism, post-statism, post-capitalism, post-(western) civilisation, post-internationalism, post-modernism, post-heroic warfare, and so on.[64] While there is considerable debate and contention over just what this new era will end up looking like, with opposing visions of the future being

shaped as much by the theoretical leanings of the commentators as by what is actually happening around us, there is broad agreement (at least among academic commentators) that we are entering truly 'new times'.

5. Other Issues

Warfighting, gender and discrimination

LWD1's continuing and, in my view, undue emphasis on warfighting and war winning not only conflicts with how Australia's armed forces are likely to be employed in the future, it may also reinforce an organisational culture which equates militarised violence with manhood and statehood, and serve to foster or at least condone continuing, albeit declining, acts of discrimination against women service personnel.[64] In her book, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives*, Cynthia Enloe discusses how military institutions play 'a special role in the ideological structure of patriarchy' by emphasising the connections between masculinity and combat. Even in today's highly technological societies, she suggests,

> there is still the widespread presumption that a man is unproven in his manhood until he is engaged in *collective, violent, physical, struggle* against someone categorised as 'the enemy' - i.e. combat. For men to experience combat is supposed to be the chance to assert their control, their capacity for domination, conquest, even to gain immortality.[66]

To be man, moreover, is to be *not* a woman. While the military has always relied on women as nurses, wives, clerical and factory workers, prostitutes, and other 'camp followers', women as *women* cannot be allowed into the inner sanctum of combat since this 'would throw into confusion all men's certainty about their male identity and thus about their claim to privilege in the social order'.[67] In peacetime, masculinity in the military may be less about surviving in combat as surviving the rigours of training for combat. In both cases, the conventional wisdom has it that such training and service is both noble and individually validating. It 'will make a man' of those who do it. As noted by Nancy Wilds, as long as women are considered interlopers in this traditional warrior territory, 'men will intentionally subject them to sexual harassment and gender discrimination to make them feel intimidated and out of place'.[68]

The idea that militaries are bastions of masculinity is reinforced by the fact that armed forces across different times and within different cultural settings have always been, and remain today, almost exclusively male. The sanctity of the combat role is further reflected in the value structures that operate within militaries themselves where, for example, infantry and other combat arms have privileged status within the Army, and combat pilots and their values are said to represent the 'essence' of the Air Force. As Enloe describes, male officers and their advisers often use their existing positions of authority to declare that only men can be engaged in combat and then to argue that their involvement in combat (either 'actually or vicariously') entitles them to remain 'the chief defenders of the state' in times of both war and peace.[69]

In Australia's case, this kind of self-serving discourse and its gendered view of the military (and society) is enhanced by the country's experiences of war and the folklore, alluded to in LWD1, that has been constructed around these experiences. Apart from the Aborigines, and those in northern Australia who were bombed by the Japanese in 1942, Australians have never directly experienced warfare or military conflict on their own soil. The practice, rather, has been for Australian military forces to be despatched overseas in support of our allies' imperial or world orders. Between 1880 and 1990, Australian forces served and fought in the Sudan (1885), the Boer War (1899-1902), the Boxer Rebellion (1900), World War I (1914-1918), World War II (1939-45), the Korean War (1950-53), the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the Indonesian Confrontation in Borneo (1963-66), the Vietnam War (1962-1972) and the Persian Gulf War (1990).

These overseas expeditions underpin a strong military folklore which is centred on the landing of Australian and New Zealand combat soldiers at Gallipoli in 1915 and their subsequent experiences in northern Africa and western Europe. Although a military disaster, the events at Anzac Cove were celebrated by politicians and other conservative elements of the Australian polity who claimed that the soldier's 'baptism of fire' enabled a young Australia to take its rightful place in history. As Patricia Grimshaw and her colleagues describe, nation-building in Australia was thus directly connected to the exploits of its male citizens in battle: '[n]ations and men had to be proven and war was the ultimate proving ground of both. The achievement of Australian manhood was the achievement of nationhood'. The same authors went on to note that women were given no place in this emerging national myth:

> . . . the blood women actually shed in giving birth — their deaths, their courage and endurance, their babies — were rendered invisible. In determining the meaning of men's deeds — their landing at Gallipoli — women's procreative capacities were at once appropriated and erased. Men's deeds were rendered simultaneously sacred and seminal. Though women gave birth to the population, only men it seemed could give birth to the imperishable political entity of the nation.[70]

Since Gallipoli, Australians have continued to be 'educated' in these meanings of Anzac through the country's schooling system, from visits to the national war memorial in Canberra, by reading Australia's official and semi-official military historiography which is centred around C. E. W. Bean's ritualised accounts of the First AIF, by the nation's films and war prose, and via continuing public pageants and displays including, especially, Anzac day. As Ken Inglis has remarked, over time, the various accounts, rites and icons of Anzac, and the subsequent overseas wars in which Australians fought and died, have come to approach Rousseau's notion of a secular religion with many in Australia seeing Anzac day as our 'true' national day.[71] Again, women and women's experiences of war have played at most a marginal role in these celebrations, and attempts by some women, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to raise these issues — through parallel marches on Anzac day to protest against the rape of women in war — were met with considerable resistance and hostility from male politicians and civic leaders.[72]

It is true that the kind of society and associated mores that are remembered on Anzac day have changed dramatically as a result of, among other things, feminism, globalisation and Mabo. In spite of the efforts of the current and previous governments, the public resonance of the digger myth may also have waned as the original veterans have died off and the ethnic mix of Australian society has been radically altered by the massive influx of post-war migrants. In spite of these changes, Australia remains by most measures a largely patriarchal (and patriotic) society. Its military forces remain predominantly white and of western European origin.[73] And Australian popular militarism, while no longer of the 'spectator sport' variety, is no less masculinised and combat-oriented. The roots of sexual harassment and discrimination in the military are therefore still present. This is in spite of the fact that the proportion of women serving in the ADF in recent times has increased significantly, the ADF itself has not been involved in a significant conventional war for over twenty years, and the roles and functions of the armed forces of industrialised nations generally are changing dramatically as we continue to move beyond the bounds of the Cold War.

As we have seen, this last trend is likely to continue with the ADF being required to conduct a range of non-combat tasks such as UN peacekeeping and peace-building, the provision of infrastructure support to failed or failing states, the fight against international crime, and the monitoring and protection of the environment. This growing emphasis on security rather than narrowly-defined defence tasks provides an opportunity to move Australia's military culture away from its traditional masculinist and combat-centred roots and, in so-doing, facilitate the amelioration and removal of the basic causes of sexual harassment and other forms of gendered discrimination. The difficulty of implementing such a fundamental change should not be underestimated, of course, since it would be strongly resisted by conservative forces at ADFA and within the ADF and broader political circles, by ex-service organisations, and by those who have been brought up with, or continue to profit by, traditional and gendered images of the military and society. Such a move, however, would be a measure of Australia and the ADF's own maturity and capacity to lead the world in dealing with the blight of sexual harassment and sexual discrimination.

1 A much more coherent and intelligible treatment of the role of doctrine is contained in the latest edition of the RAAF's *Air Power Manual* (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1998), Chapter 1.

2 The RAAF talks about basic, operational and tactical air power doctrine where basic air power doctrine 'establishes the fundamental philosophy for the employment of air power', operational air power doctrine 'provides the basis for the planning and conduct of air campaigns waged in the context of joint operations', and tactical air power doctrine 'provides the procedural basis for the detailed planning and execution of roles and tasks' *Air Power Manual*, p. 4.

3 See, for example, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35 (1998), 621–34.

4 John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). For a counter view, see William R. Thompson, 'The Future of Transitional Warfare', in *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, ed. James Burk (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) pp. 63–92; and John Orme, 'The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity', *International Security*, 22 (1997), 138–67. Interesting discussions of the future of war in the Asia Pacific are contained in J. Mohan Malik, 'The Sources and Nature of Future Conflicts in the Asia-Pacific', in *Comparative Strategy*, 16 (1997), 33–66; and James L. Richardson, 'The Declining Probability of War Thesis: How Relevant for the Asia-Pacific?', in *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus*, ed. Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997) pp. 81–100.

5 Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Nuclear Armageddon* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989); Carl Kaysen, 'Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay', in *International Security*, 14 (1990), 42–69; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, 20 (Summer 1995), 5–38.

6 For a more detailed discussion of the different visions of the future system of world order and their implications for the future role of armed force(s), see Graeme Cheeseman, 'Alternative Futures' in *Testing the Limits*, ed. Shaun Clarke (ed), (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1998), pp. 55–76, and Robert Harkavy, 'Images of the Coming International System', *Orbis*, 41 (1997), 569–90.

7 Not everyone accepts that economic globalisation has advanced as extensively or as evenly as suggested here or that it has significantly undermined the power of individual governments. See, for example, P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

8 Donald Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p 5.

9 Barry Buzan, 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century', *International Affairs* 67 (1991), 431–51; James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', *International Organization* 46 (1992), 467–91; Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1993); Steven Metz, *Strategic Horizons: The Military Implications of Alternative Futures* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1997); Snow, *Uncivil Wars*.

10 Snow, *Uncivil Wars*, pp 11–13.

11 Snow, *Uncivil Wars*, pp 13–19.

12 Singer and Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil*.

13 Steven Metz, 'Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures', *Parameters*, 27 (3, 1997), 15–26 (pp. 18–19).

14 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Wars and Anti-Wars: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), p. 161.

15 LWD1's list of the determinants of Australia's strategic policy tends to be very utilitarian. It gives considerable attention to what it calls 'geo-strategic' factors, but provides little or no discussion of the role (and importance) of the country's broader political and strategic cultures; it mentions but does not elaborate on the services' 'doctrinal preferences and organisational traditions', and while celebrating the importance of Australia's alliance relationships says nothing about the place (or continuing) relevance to Australia of Anglo-American strategic doctrine.

16 An excellent discussion of the complex nature of security and the important connections between the strategic or military and other dimensions of security is contained in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd edn. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

17 Globalisation will not only affect the future role of military force(s) in international affairs but the role and relative importance of the state as well. The idea that states can exert sovereign control over their 'national economies' has no credibility in a world of global markets, 'quicksilver capital', and growing consumer discretion. Indeed states have become, by and large, agents of the globalisation process. The physical, cultural and psychological underpinnings of state sovereignty, too, are being increasingly eroded or circumscribed by technological developments such as satellite remote sensing and the spread of electronic data networks, and by the unimpeded flow of ideas and information, drugs, lifestyle cultures, criminal activities and pollution. Under assault from both above and below, the image of the state as posited by classical realist/neorealist thinking is seen as increasingly problematic and subject to change. These developments are likely to have major implications for the traditional role of armed forces and the continuing relationships between the armed forces and both the state and society. Again, these issues and their potential implications are not raised in either ASP '97 or LWD1.

18 van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, pp. 197 and 212.

19 Ralph Peters, 'After the Revolution', *Parameters*, 25 (Summer 1995), 12. A similar future is painted by Robert Kaplan in 'The Coming Anarchy', *The Atlantic Monthly*, 273, (2, 1994), pp. 44–81. Kaplan suggests that 'West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism' (p. 46).

[20] See Michael Klare, 'An Avalanche of Guns: Light Weapons Trafficking and Armed Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era', in *Restructuring the Global Sector Volume I: New Wars*, ed. Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (London and Washington: Pinter/The United Nations University, 1997) pp. 55–77.

[21] Ulrich Albrecht, Mary Kaldor and Genevieve Schmeder, 'Introduction', in *Restructuring the Global Military Sector Volume II: The End of Military Fordism*, ed. Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht and Genevieve Schmeder (London and Washington, Pinter/United Nations University, 1998) pp. 1–10 (p. 6).

[22] See, for example, Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Daniel Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Snow, *Uncivil Wars*.

[23] Snow, *Uncivil Wars*. See also Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Orgnanized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction' in *Restructuring the Global Military Sector Volume I: New Wars*, pp. 3–33.

[24] Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 8. See also Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[25] The literature on globalisation is enormous. For an excellent introduction to the subject, see Jan Aart Scholte, 'The Globalization of World Politics', in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 13–30 and references therein. It should be noted that the trend towards political fragmentation is as much a response to modernity, secularism and post-colonialism as it is globalisation.

[26] *Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security*, ed. Gary Smith and StJohn Kettle (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1992); and *Threats Without Enemies*, ed. Gwyn Prins (London: Earthscan, 1993).

[27] There is a huge contemporary literature dealing with the potential links between resource depletion and environmental degradation and (largely inter-state) conflict. For an overview of this literature, see Lorraine Elliott, 'Environmental Conflict: Reviewing the Arguments', *Journal of Environment and Development*, 5 (June 1996), 149–67; and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35 (1998), 381–400.

[28] van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*. See also John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); and Stephen J. Cimbala, *The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

[29] Snow, *Uncivil Wars*, p. 7.

[30] Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the US Air Force*, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 255.

[31] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Wars and Anti-Wars*, pp. 91–2.

[32] See, for example, *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations*, ed. Michael Pugh (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); and *Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation*, ed. W. S. G. Bateman and Stephen Bates (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996).

[33] Some recent examples are *New Era Security: The RAAF in the Next Twenty-Five Years*, ed. Alan Stephens (Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1996); *Environmentally Responsible Defence*, ed. Peter Crabb, Julie Kesby and Laurie Olive (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996); *NATO/CCMS Environmental Security Conference*, ed. Kent Hughes Butts (US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Environmental Security Series No. 1, 1997); *Proceedings of the Regional Asia Pacific Defence Environmental Workshop*, ed. Catherine A. J. Phinney and Kent Hughes Butts (eds), (US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Environmental Security Series No. 5, 1998).

[34] See *Green Security or Militarized Environment*, ed. Jyrki Kakonen (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994); and Richard A. Mathew, 'The Greening of US Foreign Policy', *Issues in Science and Technology*, 13 (1996), pp. 39–47.

[35] See John W. Jandoora, 'Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War', *Parameters*, 25 (1995), pp. 55–67.

[36] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 7. See also Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35 (1998), pp. 381–400.

[37] See Trevor Findlay, 'The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers: SIPRI Research Report No. 12*, ed. Trevor Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press/ SIPRI, 1996), pp. 1–31.

[38] There is a huge literature on the emergence, characteristics and implications of this 'new' form of peacekeeping. Some examples include *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Brad C. Hayes (London, Macmillan, 1995); Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995) and *Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, ed. S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-George Ehrhart (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997).

[39] For an excellent overview of this issue, see Hugh Smith, 'The Last Casualty? Public Perceptions of Bearable Cost in a Democracy', unpublished mimeo, 1999.

40 Edward N. Luttwak, 'The Crisis of Classic Military Power and the Remedy of "Post-Heroic" Intelligence-Based Warfare', in *The Information Revolution and International Security*, ed. Ryan Henry and Joseph S. Nye (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies Press, 1998) pp. 70–104.

41 Barry M. Blechman, 'The Intervention Dilemma', *The Washington Quarterly*, 18 (3, 1995), 63–73; David B. Steele, 'Securing Peace for Humanitarian Aid?', *International Peacekeeping*, 5, (Spring 1998), 66–88.

42 John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent, 'A New Approach to Complex Emergencies', *International Peacekeeping*, 4 (Winter 1997), 31–49 (p. 46).

43 Findlay, The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', p. 13.

44 The document does state that land forces will have a prominent role in 'military support operations' and 'military responses short of war', because 'these operations typically require presence, compassion and cooperation with local communities'.

45 See John MacKinlay and Randolph Kent, 'Complex Emergencies Doctrine: The British are Still the Best', *RUSI Journal*, 142, (2, 1997), 39–44; and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making?', *International Peacekeeping*, 5 (Autumn 1998), 106–23. Useful descriptions of the various kinds of peace operations currently in vogue are contained in Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues*, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1996).

46 Daniel, 'Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations?', in Daniel and Hayes (eds), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, p. 69. He adds the important point that peace enforcement differs from fully fledged enforcement operations in that military contingents involved in the former 'cannot assume that theirs is a combat task intended to break all resistance once and for all. Rather the same personnel expected to demonstrate resolve and augment consent are also expected to do so with the lightest touch possible in the hope that the parties that will finally assent to the UN's will. They have to avoid taking sides and still alleviate the sufferings of innocents being subjected to unspeakable cruelties. They may have to deal with leaders whom in other circumstnces they might arrest as thugs or war criminals. Hence, it would not be surprising if the soldiers involved regarded the means as contradictory to the ends'.

47 The following summary is drawn largely from Daniel, 'Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations?', pp. 70–8.

48 Established in 1994, the SBAS is a confidential database of the military and other resources individual states are prepared to provide to the UN within specific timeframes for Security Council-authorized peace operations. As at March 1999, 81 member states had pledged a total of some 104,000 personnel including both individuals and formed military units. The bulk of the proposed resources comprises infantry personnel or forces. According to the UN 'there continues to be a need for additional resources to complement manoeuvre units with the necessary logistics support' ('Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping', 30 March 1999, S/1999/361). For an example of how forces are now being prepared for this role, see Peter Viggo Jacobsen, 'The Danish Approach to Peace Operations after the Cold War'.

49 See Michelle Griffin, 'Blue Helmet Blues: assessing the Trend Towards Subcontracting', *Security Dialogue*, 30 (1999), 43–60.

50 For a discussion of how this applies in the Australian case, see Graeme Cheeseman, 'Structuring the Australian Defence Force for United Nations Operations: Change and Resistance', in *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts*, ed. Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 231–52.

51 Colin McInnes, 'Restructuring the British Army' in *About Turn, Forward March with Europe*', ed. Sharp (London: IPPR/Rivers Oram Press, 1996), pp. 49–62, (p. 55).

52 Michael J. Dziedzic, 'Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in Public Security during Peace Operations', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 9 (1998), 132–59, (p. 136).

53 Dziedzic, 'Policing the New World Disorder', pp. 145–6. For a contrary view, see Alice Hills, 'International Peace Support Operations and CIVPOL: Should there be a Permanent Global Gendarmerie?', *International Peacekeeping*, 5 (Autumn 1998), 26–41.

54 Stephen P. Kinloch, 'Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force', in *The UN Peace and Force,* ed. Michael Pugh (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 167–90 (p. 169).

55 Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 130–31.

56 Graeme Cheeseman, 'Structuring the Australian Defence Force for United Nations Operations: Change and Resistance'.

57 See, for example, Peter Cochrane, *Simpson and the Donkey: The Making of a Legend* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992); Robin Gerster, *Big-Noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1987) and Jane Ross, *The Myth of the Digger: Australian Soldiers in Two World Wars* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1985).

58 Edward Luttwak, 'The Crisis of Classic Military Power', p. 89. More contentiously, it may also be reinforcing a view within the military itself that while military forces need to be accumulated and modernised, they should only be used under very carefully defined and controlled circumstances. This reluctance to use or sanction the use of military forces is occurring at a time, moreover, when the release of earlier Cold War constraints is fomenting the

spread of 'a new, much less restrained culture of war' which, if allowed to procede unchecked, could serve to undermine international peace and stability.

59 Gustav Daniker, *The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces* (New York and Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper No. 36), p. 93.

60 Daniker, *The Guardian Soldier*, p. 95. 'In the long run', Daniker argues, 'today's enemies will be linked by common interests tomorrow. It is perhaps the most noble task of modern military leaders not to obstruct or delay this process while they are still engaged in an ongoing open conflict'.

61 Daniker, *The Guardian Soldier*, pp. 103–4.

62 Daniker, *The Guardian Soldier*, p. 104. In Daniker's schema, 'protection' continues to include the 'classic defense mission against the attempt of an aggressor to seize a country and its population, [and] the establishment of a war-preventing effect like deterrence . . . or "dissuasion"'. But it 'also encompasses all the law enforcement functions against the use of force of strategic scope below the threshold of war, such as large-scale terrorism or gang warfare with which thepolice is unable to cope . . . [and] the battle against organised crime'.

63 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992) and R. O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter, 1992).

64 See for example Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); A. Amin, *Post-Fordism: A Reader* (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1994); James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Edward N. Luttwak, 'Towards Post-Heroic Warfare', *Foreign Affairs* (1995), 109–122.

65 See Clare Burton, *Women in the Australian Defence Force* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1996); Australian Defence Force, *Report of the Review into Policies and Prctices to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1998).

66 Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (London: Pluto Press, 1983) p. 13.

67 Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, p. 15.

68 Nancy G. Wilds, 'Sexual Harassment in the Military', *Minerva*, 8 (Winter 1990), 1–16 (p. 4).

69 Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, p. 63.

70 Patricia Grimshaw *et al*, *Creating a Nation* (Ringwood: McPhee Gribble, 1994), p. 218.

71 K. S. Inglis, 'ANZAC and the Australian Military Tradition', *CurrentAffairs Bulletin* (April 1988), 4–15.

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