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**CANADA'S POST-COLD-WAR
MILITARY BLUES AND ITS LESSONS
FOR AUSTRALIA**



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Canada's Post-Cold-War Military Blues and its Lessons for Australia

Graeme Cheeseman

The last decade of the twentieth century was an extraordinarily turbulent and unsettling one for Canada's defence establishment and its members. Official spending on defence continued to be pared back even as successive governments committed the country's armed forces to more and more overseas and domestic activities. The organisation itself continued to be reviewed and reorganised. Morale among Canada's service personnel fell to the extent that the military leadership lost the support of many of its junior officers and other ranks. And there occurred a number of incidents which shook the armed forces to its core, threatened the long-held confidence of the Canadian public in its military institutions, and imposed onto an already overwhelmed and increasingly defensive organisation still further inquiries, reviews and reforms.

The first part of this paper seeks to give some meaning and context to these various events and their implications. Is the current crisis being driven by the peculiarities of Canada's own political and historical circumstances or is it more a manifestation of the fundamentally 'new times' into which we are heading? Where might we expect the changes taking place to lead and with what consequences? It begins by outlining how Canada's political and military leaders have formally responded to their changing strategic, political and social milieu. It then looks more closely at the tensions that exist within Canada's defence establishment and the associated debates over the future roles of peacekeeping and warfighting as a primary military role. The second half of the paper looks at whether Australia's decision makers have anything to learn or fear from the Canadian experience. Are the factors contributing to Canada's post-Cold-War military blues present in Australia and might they produce a similar result?

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian military in crisis

The last decade of the twentieth century was an extraordinarily turbulent and unsettling one for Canada's defence establishment and its members. Official spending on defence continued to be pared back even as successive governments committed the country's armed forces to more and more overseas and domestic activities. The organisation itself continued to be reviewed and reorganised and a large number of long-standing bases and institutions, such as the military colleges in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, were closed down. Existing defence policies and practices were attacked by the media. Morale among Canada's service personnel fell to the extent that the military leadership lost the support of many of its junior officers and other ranks. And there occurred a number of incidents which shook the armed forces to its core, threatened the long-held confidence of the Canadian public in its military institutions, and imposed onto an already overwhelmed and increasingly defensive organisation still further inquiries, reviews and structural and policy changes.

The most important, and traumatic, of these was undoubtedly the so-called Somalia affair wherein members of the elite Canadian parachute regiment tortured and murdered a sixteen year-old Somali citizen, shot and killed a number of others including one in the back as he fled from a military compound, and mistreated others who had been detained while attempting to steal food and other items from Canadian storage areas. These and other incidents were eventually investigated by a government appointed commission of inquiry which revealed, in a five volume report entitled *Dishonoured Legacy*, a litany of problems and shortcomings that extended well beyond the regiment and its area of operations around the village of Belet Huen. These included weak leadership both in the field and at home, inadequate training and preparation for the mission, a fundamentally flawed system of military reporting and discipline, and, perhaps most seriously of all, evidence of a deliberate and systematic cover-up at the very highest levels (indeed, as the inquiry sought to come to terms with the fact that the documentary evidence provided by the Department of National Defence (DND) was either incomplete or had been tampered with, the Chretien

Government effectively terminated its considerations by calling for the report to be made by the end of March 1997). The Commission itself was clearly dismayed and disappointed by this event and by its findings, arguing that they revealed 'the extent of the morass into which our military has fallen', and concluding that 'it is time for a new leadership to emerge in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, and...to guide the forces in a new direction. Our dedicated and long-suffering soldiers deserve at least this much' (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Volume 5, 1997: 1466).²

The commission of inquiry was not alone in its criticisms of the Canadian Forces (CF) and Canadian defence. In his 1998 *Lament for an Army*, John English argued that the Somali episode constituted 'the worst crisis in the history of Canada's military establishment', and was an inevitable consequence of an Army that had, since the end of the Korean War, 'lost its way'.

Constant buffeting by the cross-currents of unification, bilingualism, and peacekeeping had, in addition to the overt civilianization of NDHQ, seriously eroded the professional foundations of army educational and training establishments set up after the war. With little depth and less corporate knowledge, there thus developed a widespread tendency to believe that the only kind of experience that counted was one's own, preferably gained in officially approved usually highly bureaucratized slots (English, 1998: 63-4).

The Army's 'long journey into night', English continued, was marked by a number of specific developments including: the dismantling of the General Staff system as part of the unification of the Canadian forces; the termination of qualification exams for middle-level Army officers and the subsequent downgrading of Army's staff college curricula and standards; the retention of the British regimental system which provided a vehicle for increasing cronyism within the officer corps; the absence of political interest or direction by governments of all persuasions; and, especially, the increasing emphasis given to peacekeeping and other non-military roles in the wake of the end of the Cold War (see also Theriault and Douglas, 1997). These developments were seen to foster the latent anti-intellectualism that existed within the Army in particular and which made it 'prone to fads'. The restoration of the military professionalism

of Canada's earlier armed forces, English concluded, required no less than the purging of its senior echelon of officers, the reinstatement of the militia as a mobilisation base, and 'the encouragement of creativity, inquisitiveness and self-criticism' within Canada's system of officer education and training as well as the officer corps as a whole (producing what he described as a 'Hegelian army').

Canada's Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) similarly warned that the country's armed forces have neither the manpower nor the modern technological resources 'to implement a national security policy commensurate with emerging threats in the new and unstable international milieu'. In its view, Canada was at a 'crossroads in its national development' and, in order to retain its global standing and advance its national interests, it needed to maintain combat-capable forces capable of engaging in a wide variety of operations both at home and abroad (CDA, 1999). This theme was repeated by Douglas Ross who suggested that the defence and foreign policies of the Chretien Government overall were doing 'grave damage to Canadian power, position, and influence over "high" political issues on the global agenda', and will ensure that 'Canada becomes one of the largest of the small powers – not the smallest of the great' (Ross, 1996–7: 2 and 20).

In this paper I endeavour to make sense of what is currently going on in Canada, to give some meaning and context to the events and debates just described, and speculate on what might still lie ahead for those in the country's defence establishment. Are the Canadian Forces really in crisis or are we simply witnessing the usual complaints of disgruntled war-fighters in peacetime? If there is a crisis, is it being driven by the peculiarities of Canada's own political and historical circumstances or is it more a manifestation of the fundamentally 'new times' into which we are heading?³ Where might we expect the changes taking place to lead to and with what consequences? Will the structure, capabilities and identity of Canada's armed forces change even more in the future than they have in the past, in what ways, and with what kind of consequences for military morale and civil-military relations generally? The paper begins by outlining how Canada's political and military leaders have formally responded to their changing strategic, political and social milieu. It then looks more closely at the tensions that exist within Canada's defence establishments and the

associated debates over the future roles of peacekeeping and warfighting as a primary military role. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some of the possible lessons the Canadian experience may have for policy makers in Australia.

Responding to 'New Times': Canadian Defence Policies 1990–2000

As it entered the 1990s, Canada's defence efforts were still being driven by the provisions of the Mulroney Government's 1987 defence white paper, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. (DND, 1987) Written during the Cold War, this document focused on developing strong and sustainable military forces that would contribute to the defence of both western Europe and north America against the prospect of a Soviet attack. Almost as soon as the white paper was released, however, it was clear to most commentators that the 'Soviet threat' could no longer be taken seriously and that this required, in turn, a fundamental re-evaluation of Canada's existing defence and security thinking and policies. Sensing the emergence of a new and less threatening international order, many Canadians also began to anticipate the receipt of some sort of 'peace dividend' (Finan and Fleming, 1995).

The Government appeared to agree with these emerging sentiments and, contrary to the guidance given in the white paper, began to cut Canada's expenditure on defence (Galigan, 1996). Its April 1989 budget announced that the Department of National Defence would reduce its spending over the ensuing five years by some \$C2.7 billion, close down a number of existing military bases, and not proceed with certain planned major equipment acquisitions including, in particular, the nuclear-powered submarines. The Government's 1991 *Statement on Defence Policy* foreshadowed the closure of Canada's bases in Europe and the reduction of its forces there to just 1100 personnel as part of an overall reduction of Canada's permanent forces from 81,000 to around 75,000. The following year it announced that Canada's forces in Europe would be withdrawn altogether and that a number of other major equipment projects would be cancelled. These included the Multi-Role Combat Vehicle (MRCV) which had been approved a mere six months earlier (Rossignol, 1994).

During this time, criticisms of the white paper, and the Mulroney and Campbell Governments' foreign and defence policies generally, continued apace. As described above, some observers felt that the policies were incoherent and increasingly out of touch with Canada's evolving international circumstances. Others felt that Canada had grown too close to the United States, while some worried about an apparent decline in the governments' support for the United Nations and the process of multilateralism (see Langille, 1990 and Knight, 1999 and references therein). The then Liberal opposition tapped into these debates and developed an alternative foreign and defence policy stance which took into account

the flux in the international political and security environment, the obvious linkages between foreign and domestic policy, an expanded conceptualization of security, Canada's multilateralist impulse, the desire of Canadians for an activist and internationalist foreign policy geared towards the diversification of Canada's trade and foreign relations (rather than one overly dependent on the whims and fancy of the US), and the importance of democratizing the foreign policy process (Knight, 1999: 22)

On its election to office in 1993, the incoming Liberal Government appointed Special Joint Committees of the Senate and House of Commons to conduct public inquiries into Canada's foreign and defence policies. The committees traveled across the country, received some 560 submissions and heard from over 1350 witnesses from all sectors of Canadian society including a range of business, bureaucratic, academic and non-government organisations (Legault, 1999: 76–7). According to Albert Legault, the views being expressed to the committees lay between two extremes:

At one pole were advocates of the almost complete demilitarization of Canada, while at the other, more conservative pole, were people supporting the maintenance of multi-purpose and credible armed forces. Between these two poles, there was near universal attachment to Canadian internationalism and to Canada's involvement in international security via the UN (Legault, 1999: 77).

Those who supported the retention of military forces were divided into two further schools of thought: those,

largely from within the defence establishment, who wanted to retain general purpose forces capable of engaging in conventional warfare operations, and those who thought Canada's armed forces should be restructured for UN peacekeeping and other low-level contingencies (Sokolsky, 1995: 8; Bland, 1997: 282).

The Special Joint Committee reporting on *Canada's Defence Policy*, rejected any move towards isolationism or disarmament. It argued that, in view of its changing and increasingly complex surroundings, Canada needed to maintain unified, combat-capable, multipurpose armed forces comprising sea, land and air elements that are properly equipped and able to operate together at home and with other forces abroad. Canada needed also to 'continue to participate actively in the full range of United Nations and other multilateral peace operations', and push for further reform of the UN and its peacekeeping institutions and procedures. Restoring peace to troubled territories was 'not simply a matter of putting trained peacekeepers on the ground – there is a corresponding challenge of building the institutional capacity for peacekeeping and peacemaking. Given its history and experience in the field, moreover, Canada should be expected to take a lead in this last area of reform (Report of the Special Joint Committee, 1994: 5).

This basic position was largely accepted by the Chretien Government and informed its own white paper on defence which was released by the then Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, in December 1994. The 1994 white paper, which continues to underpin Canada's present defence policies, noted the recent and continuing progress in international affairs, particularly in the areas of European security, nuclear arms control, and the resolution of a number of protracted regional conflicts. Offsetting these causes for optimism, however, were a number of perceived security concerns including global population and environmental pressures, ethnic conflict especially within failed and failing states, and the continuing spread of conventional and unconventional weapons and their means of delivery. The white paper concluded that while it would:

be wrong to concentrate attention exclusively on extreme cases of disorder in some regions at the expense of real progress elsewhere...it [nonetheless] seems prudent to plan for a world characterized in the long term by

instability...Canada's defence policy must reflect the world as it is, rather than the world as we would like it to be (DND, 1994: 7).

It was thus in the country's national interest to maintain 'multi-purpose, combat-capable forces' which could 'operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent – that is to fight “alongside the best, against the best”' (DND, 1994: 14–5).

Thus, in spite of the changed, and still changing, international setting, the defence objectives set out in Canada's 1994 defence white paper remained largely the same as those of its predecessors, albeit with some changes in emphasis and tone. Canada's armed forces would continue to contribute to international security operations through such organisations as the United Nations, NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) although the government would be more discerning than previously over what kinds of forces it would make available and where they would go.⁴ They would still be required to help protect Canadians and Canadian sovereignty through the provision of aid to the civil power and by assisting in such peacetime activities as air and sea surveillance and control, border security, fisheries protection, environmental monitoring, disaster relief, and search and rescue. And they would continue to contribute to the joint military defence of north America through membership of NORAD and in accordance with a range of existing agreements with the United States. Most importantly, Canada's armed forces would continue to be structured for its warfighting rather than its peacekeeping and other security roles on the grounds that 'combat training – undertaken on a national basis as well as with allies – remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions'.

Because it reflected the existing status quo, the 1994 white paper attracted reasonably widespread, if qualified, support from Canada's defence community whose members generally regarded it as the best that could be expected given the government's indifference to defence issues and the circumstances in which the document was developed (see Sokolsky, 1995; Oliver, 1998). Their principal and, as described in the following section, well-founded qualification was whether the Chretien Government would provide sufficient resources to fund the whole of the program

contained in the white paper, or whether it would follow its predecessor's example and continue to reduce defence expenditure in order to help reduce the national debt and pay for the social and other programs it had promised while in opposition. A further problem for the Government was that the white paper did not address, at least not directly, many of the problems being illuminated by the Somali and other internal scandals. In order to stem the negative publicity flowing from these, Collette's successor, Doug Young, instituted in December 1996 a high level review of the state of Canada's armed forces.⁵

Rather than have his Department or the Canadian Forces conduct this review, Young asked four 'distinguished academics' to provide their views on a range of issues of concern, and dispatched one of his senior staffers to canvass other individuals and groups who had 'significant expertise in defence matters' (Holman, 1997: 32). The Minister also set up a Special Advisory Group to examine the military justice system and its investigative services. The report of the review, entitled *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, was presented to the Prime Minister in March 1997. The report reaffirmed the strategic analysis and conclusions contained in the 1994 defence white paper and the overall structure of, and existing power-sharing arrangements within, Canada's higher defence establishment (although it also recommended that the roles and responsibilities of the key actors in DND be clarified and made more transparent).⁶ It called for more stability and predictability in defence funding and made 65 detailed recommendations, all of which were approved by the Government, on issues ranging from military education to the CF's rank structure and conditions of service.⁷

The 1997 ministerial review, together with the guidance contained in the 1994 white paper and the government's annual budget statements, provide the foundations of Canada's post-Cold War defence policies and structures as well as its own internal program of review and reform. The process of translating this overall guidance into a program of action is guided, in turn, by the provisions of the Federal Government's Expenditure Management System which requires line departments each year to submit a Departmental Business Plan and a Departmental Plans and Priorities Report to the Treasury Board and thence the Cabinet for consideration and approval. The key document in the

preparation of DND's Business Plan is its annual Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) which is prepared by the VCDS and provides strategic, planning, resources and performance measurement guidance to the Department's line managers to help them prepare their own business plans and associated resource requirements. In addition to guidance from the government, the provisions of the DPG can also be informed by special studies and position papers prepared for or within the DND itself. Some key examples of these include: the strategic overview paper prepared annually by the Directorate of Strategic Analysis Policy Group in DND; the RMA concept paper, *Canadian Defence Beyond 2010: The Way Ahead* (DND, 1999b), prepared by the RMA Operational Working Group within National Defence Headquarters; and the position paper entitled *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (DND, 1999c).

In their different ways, each of these documents spell out the various tasks and challenges confronting Canada's defence and security planners as they move into the twenty first century. The 1998 strategic overview thus warned of the 'powerful forces' that were reshaping politics and economics and generating the potential for cooperation and conflict at both the global and national levels. The RMA concept paper similarly noted that 'the international environment was now less stable, more unpredictable, and increasingly technically sophisticated' and will therefore place 'considerably greater demands on DCD/CF and make it critical that capabilities which may be required in the future be examined today'. Continuing technological and other changes in global society, moreover, were seen to be radically altering the character of modern warfare, and the ways that military forces in general and the CF in particular would need to be structured, equipped, trained and educated. *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence* (or Strategy 2020 as it became known) prepared by DND's senior leadership and released in June 1999 by the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the CDS, spelt out what they thought Canada's defence establishment needed to do in both the short and longer terms to meet these different challenges. These objectives went beyond the considerations we might normally associate with such documents – an elaboration of the changes in Canada's strategic environment and a statement of missions and primary force structure determinants to deal with these, and so on – to include a number of

other basic tasks. These included nurturing 'pride in the institution', positioning Defence as an 'employer of choice for Canadians', developing and sustaining 'a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust', and improving the relationships between Defence, other government organisations and the public at large.

In these regards, Strategy 2020 was as much about (re)building bridges between the key actors within Canada's defence and security community, and making up for some of the deficiencies and problems of the past, as it was about defining a vision for Canadian defence and security. Significantly it also contained warnings to both the government and those within the establishment, and their supporters, who were either unable or unprepared to adjust to Canada's rapidly changing circumstances. In a final section entitled 'Shaping our Future – Implementing the Strategy', the document stated that while 'Strategy 2020 is an achievable and pragmatic roadmap for the future of Canadian defence', its 'ultimate success' depended on a number of key factors. One of these was unity: 'No one environment, group, branch or service provider can operate in isolation from the strategy. More than ever, military and civilian members of the Defence Team need to think and act with unity of purpose'. A second factor was continuity: 'The institution does not have the resources to permit multiple radical shifts across the spectrum of capability. Rather, change must be evolutionary, focused on operational effectiveness and shared core values, and grounded in sound analysis'. While on the surface, the call for unity and pragmatism makes sense in the present climate, in practice they are potentially in conflict as we will see when we examine the sources of the continuing tensions and debates within Canada's military establishment and some of the issues and dilemmas that will confront its decision makers in the years ahead.

Mending Fences: Anguish and Angst in the Canadian Armed Forces

As described above, Canada's defence policies and practices during the Cold War were centred around three basic commitments: the support of NATO forces in Europe, the direct defence of north America against attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact allies, and the maintenance of international peace and security largely through contributions to traditional UN

peacekeeping missions. As Alan Sens has described, while all commitments were taken seriously by the defence establishment, the Euro-Atlantic dimension of Canada's defence policy clearly was given precedence in its detailed defence planning and equipment procurement procedures. As a result, Canada's armed forces

were structured largely with a view to a future European conflict, particularly with respect to the maintenance of high intensity conflict assets in a balanced land force and the attention paid to the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) missions of the Canadian navy. Procurement of weapons systems and other equipment was largely influenced – some would say dictated – by the operational requirements of the European theatre (Sens, 1993: 9).

Over the period of the Cold War, then, the CF became increasingly professionalised and wedded to Cold War structures and doctrines. The importance, at least to the military itself, of Canada's part-time forces and traditions declined as the notion of maintaining strong, well-trained 'forces-in-being' ready to fight 'come-as-you-are' wars in Europe came to dominate official thinking and practice. Unlike the past, Canada's Cold War armies began also to measure their own worth and professional competence against their NATO, and especially, United States counterparts. As in Australia, credibility was a matter of how well Canada's forces could fight alongside its American ally and conform to American-dominated military practices and mores. The CF's attachment to NATO was not entirely shared by the governments of the day, however, which tended to see Canada's contribution to the defence of Europe in largely political rather than strategic terms. As a consequence they were less committed than their military advisers to developing state-of-the-art military forces capable of fighting alongside their American and European allies and quite ready to renege on promises to increase defence expenditures or to reduce the ubiquitous 'commitment-capability gap'. The dominant problem confronting Canadian defence planners throughout the Cold War was not so much the threat posed by the Soviet Union, as how to find sufficient resources to meet all of its domestic and international defence needs and commitments. The solution to this persistent problem, moreover, was never entirely solved and so, over time, and as the cost of modern weapons systems increased, the overall

capability and technical proficiency of Canada's armed forces slowly declined as it underwent what Douglas Bland called a process of 'structural disarmament' (Bland, 1994: 109).⁸

This reduction in the capacity of Canada's armed forces generated the concerns, described earlier, over the decline in Canada's military professionalism and contributed to growing tensions within the armed services themselves. As Bland (1995: 28–33) described, these operated at two broad levels: between officers and other ranks, and between Canada's operational commanders and their staff counterparts in NDHQ where the former believed, rightly or wrongly, that many of the latter had abandoned their corporate responsibilities in favour of narrowly defined personal or single service interests. These tensions increased as officers and soldiers in the field were confronted with the practical consequences of the growing 'commitment-capability' gap, and grew to a head after the release of the 1987 defence white paper. In the years preceding the September 1984 general election, the Opposition Progressive Conservative Party had made much of the mounting dissatisfaction within the armed forces and promised that, if elected, they would restore defence funding to an appropriate level. This promise was repeated in the newly elected government's 1987 white paper and raised hopes within the Canadian Forces that their problems would finally be recognised and dealt with. Indeed, according to Bland, 'officers were detailed to visit bases and units and to encourage soldiers to support the government's initiative'. For their part, commanders 'eagerly accepted the word of the minister and the CDS and staked their reputations on the promise that the government would restore direction and pride to the CF' (Bland, 1995: 32). As we have seen, the promises given in the white paper proved hollow, which had dire consequences for service morale and relations between the CF and its leaders. As Bland described:

Senior officers felt betrayed because they were not consulted but would have to explain to their soldiers changes they did not support. In these circumstances, many officers assumed that the government's rapid volte-face and the negation of its promise to provide the tools for the job would cause the CDS and other officers to resign on a point of honour. None did. Officers and soldiers were first surprised, then resentful, and finally sullenly resigned to the idea that no one valued their contribution, understood their needs, nor represented their points of view. Soldiers in the

field, their expectations of fair treatment shattered, began to see themselves on one side of a line and their senior leaders on another as defence commitments in dangerous places, such as the former Yugoslavia, continued unabated (Bland, 1995:32).

The tensions within Canada's armed forces increased in the 1990s in light of the revelations from the Somalia inquiry, almost daily reports of scandals, investigations, and incidences of officer in-fighting, and continuing defence cuts and base closures. That these events deeply affected the confidence of many serving personnel in Canada's military and political leadership was clear from internal opinion polls conducted by the CF (Bratt, 1998: 26). It could also be seen from the evidence presented to the commission of inquiry into Somalia and from the establishment and subsequent findings of a review of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, entitled *Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces* (1998).⁹ According to Gary Levy, the parliamentary inquiry differed from its predecessors in that, for the first time in the history of the Canadian Forces,

service personnel were encouraged to address their concerns in a public forum, and to do so without fear of recrimination. The Chief of Defence Staff even issued a letter reaffirming that Canadian Forces personnel could freely and openly communicate their views to the Committee which also spoke privately with service men and women on numerous occasions...in Canada and at Canadian locations in Bosnia and Germany (Levy, 1999: 14)

In its report, the Committee stated that 'countless witnesses' expressed a degree of frustration or dissatisfaction over such things as their existing living conditions and pay and allowances, and perceived official indifference to their problems and entreaties. Many, especially among the rank and file, thought they were being disproportionately blamed for the events that took place in Somalia, and that there was too little public awareness or recognition of the difficult and often dangerous tasks they were being required to carry out in Bosnia and elsewhere. The feeling overall among junior members of the armed forces was that they 'had been let down by their governments, their leadership, and the public at large' (Levy, 1999: 15).¹⁰

This growing sense of frustration and alienation within Canada's armed forces was being compounded by a number of broader factors and circumstances. The first and most obvious of these was the 'era of austerity', to use Hal Klepak's apt phrase, within which Canada's post-Cold War defence planners and practitioners were required to work (Klepak, 1996: 76). The 1994 defence white paper had stated that Canada's defence policy must respond not only to an uncertain and unstable world abroad, but also to challenging circumstances at home. These included in particular the nation's worsening fiscal circumstances – by 1994–95 the Canadian government's annual debt-servicing payment stood at \$44 billion or around twenty seven per cent of the federal budget – and a perceived demand on the part of the public for governments and their key agents to be both responsible and responsive to contemporary economic, social and other issues.¹¹

The call for fiscal responsibility signaled continuing and significant reductions in defence spending to the extent that by the financial year 1998–99, expenditure on defence had fallen some twenty three per cent below the level set by the 1993–94 budget. These continuing reductions forced the defence establishment to undertake a series of painful cost reduction measures in order simply to meet its existing commitments (DND, 1997a; Galigan, 1996). These measures included a further overhaul of both the Department of National Defence itself – which had largely escaped earlier budget cuts and, in the minds of those advising the government at least, needed to be 're-engineered' in accordance with contemporary economic and business practices (see Detomasi, 1996) – and the Canadian Forces' existing system of command and control. The first of these reviews led to the outsourcing of much of the establishment's 'non-core' business, the introduction of a new and streamlined approach to equipment acquisition, greater involvement of industry in defence planning, a new and simplified higher management structure, a shift in resources from the 'blunt' to the 'sharp end' of the organisation, and further significant reductions in both military and civilian personnel.¹² The changes to the CF's command system were no less dramatic. The existing joint Maritime, Land and Air Headquarters were abolished and their respective commanders and some staff were relocated into the National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa (which was itself cut by fifty per cent). The various Air Command headquarters were amalgamated into a single operational level headquarters – designated 1

Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters – and Canada’s land Forces were reorganised into four independent brigade groups and a deployable joint force headquarters (DND, 1996; 1998).

Even as the defence establishment was being rationalised and downsized, governments continued to commit Canada’s armed forces to a range of peace operations around the globe. The white paper and subsequent policy documents also flagged an extension of Canada’s military involvement beyond its traditional European and north American bases into Latin America and the Asia Pacific. In the second case, the white paper noted that as Canada’s economic and other interests in Asia have grown over the past few years, so it has become more active in such regional security initiatives as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security. In line with this development, the current program of bilateral military contacts with countries such as South Korea, Japan and the members of ASEAN would be expanded as would be the existing program of military visits, personnel exchanges, joint training and combined exercises (for more details, see Boutin, 1997 and Klepak, 1995).¹³ Thus while Canada’s military commitments and responsibilities declined in some areas, they were growing or were about to grow in others. Furthermore, although the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called ‘new times’ enabled Canada’s policy makers, in theory, to be more discerning about how they would use the country’s military forces, in practice their freedom of movement was likely to remain constrained by important opportunity costs associated with, say, failing to support future UN peacekeeping missions or allowing the United States greater authority over the defence of northern America (Buteux, 1996).

Compounding the uncertainties and angst generated by this new ‘commitment-capability gap’ was the prospect of even more fundamental changes in the way the CF would be structured and equipped in the future. Although the 1994 white paper left the basic objectives of Canada’s defence forces largely unchanged, the relative priority of each role was being altered significantly (although not formally) with several trends apparent. As described above, Canada’s earlier military contributions to NATO were being downgraded in favour of its national and other

international security roles.¹⁴ This was reflected in the fact that the discussion of Canada’s NATO commitments in the 1994 defence white paper was included in a chapter on international security, in the decision to return home the battalion group attached to the NATO Composite Force in Norway (it would now be deployed either as a stand-by force for the UN or, if necessary, as part of NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force) and in the increased emphasis given to supporting future UN and related multinational peacekeeping activities.¹⁵ As the white paper itself acknowledged, these changes were likely to have an important impact not only on where Canadian service personnel would serve in the future but on its existing mix of forces:

the relative weights of the naval, land and air establishments that have prevailed for many years will be adjusted, primarily to allow for the transfer of resources to where they are most needed – mainly to land combat and combat support forces – in response to the added emphasis being placed on multilateral activities, and particularly peace and stability operations (DND, 1994: 52).

Although many in the CF were comforted by the mantra, expressed in the 1994 white paper and repeated in subsequent policy statements, that Canada would continue to maintain combat-capable forces able to ‘fight alongside the best, against the best’, others remained skeptical over the government’s commitment to such a position, and their leaders’ capacity or willingness to hold ministers to their word.¹⁶ This concern was being accentuated by the debates taking place over the changing scope and nature of armed conflict in a post-Cold War and increasingly globalised world. These suggested that while crises and armed conflicts will continue into the future, they will tend to occur on the periphery of the developed world and largely within society rather than between bordered states. These ‘new wars’, ‘uncivil wars’, or ‘wars of the third kind’, as they have been variously described, will have little relevance beyond the immediate vicinity of the conflict – unless they are taken up by the international media – will often arise in the wake of the disintegration of existing states or the destruction or marginalisation of local economies, and be much more difficult to understand and manage especially from outside (Snow, 1996. See also Holsti, 1996; and Kaldor, 1999).¹⁷

These developments and debates were serving to raise further questions about the usefulness of traditional military and security mindsets, structures and practices. They were providing additional ammunition to those within Canada who feel that the CF should be (re)structured primarily to meet its peacekeeping and peacemaking duties. And, as we will see in the following section, they were encouraging other actors in Canada's security establishment, most notably the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Department, to continue to push for 'new' thinking about how security should be both thought of and approached in the future.

Peacekeeping and Human Security

Canada, like Australia and other 'middle powers', has been involved in UN peacekeeping and related operations virtually since they were first 'invented' in 1956 by Canada's then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson. For many Canadian policy makers, and politicians such as Pierre Trudeau, Canada's defence policy needed to be more an instrument of its wider foreign policy objectives. International peacekeeping was seen to provide an important means of demonstrating the country's independence from the United States. It fitted in well with Canada's developing taste for multilateralism and the related notion of 'middle-power diplomacy'. It also provided an area of policy in which Canada could exert real influence in international affairs, and a useful vehicle for enhancing the country's sense of identity at home and of projecting its strongly-held national values abroad (Keating 1993, Jockel, 1994).

As Albert Legault (1999: 72) described, Canada's peacekeeping duties during the Cold War were neither particularly onerous nor dangerous, involving modestly-sized contingents for relatively short periods of time with little real risk of combat casualties. Importantly, the deployments did not threaten to undermine Canada's other, and from its defence policy makers' perspective, more significant roles of helping defend both Europe and north America against a Soviet attack. Nor did they consume a huge amount of resources, taking up only 0.4 per cent of Canada's defence expenditure over the period of the Cold War. Nonetheless between 1945 and the mid-1990s, over 100,000 Canadians participated in various UN peacekeeping missions overseas and 100 died during operational service (the majority admittedly as a result

of accidents). These commitments contributed to increasing support for peacekeeping amongst the Canadian public, support that was reinforced by the award of the Nobel prize for peace to Pearson in 1957 and subsequently to the UN peacekeeping forces as a whole (public opinion details are contained in Finan and Fleming, 1995; Martin and Fortmann, 1995 and Stairs, 1995). While Canada's military myths were located in the war-fighting experiences of its early militias and citizen-based expeditionary forces, they were beginning, by the 1990s, to be shaped also by the activities of the country's peacekeepers.¹⁸

The public enthusiasm for peacekeeping and its growing place within Canada's popular consciousness meant that successive Canadian governments found it hard not to agree to continuing requests from the United Nations, and later NATO, for peacekeeping forces and other forms of support. It also underpinned the tendency, especially from the early 1990s, for governments and oppositions to accord greater prominence in their public statements and policies to multilateral peacekeeping, and to increase their efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations.¹⁹ As a consequence, the proportion of Canada's forces deployed on peacekeeping and other international security missions rose dramatically – in the early 1990s, nearly a quarter of Canada's regular Army personnel were on UN operations overseas (Bratt, 1998: 25) – and the CF began to find it increasingly difficult to meet all of its missions and responsibilities from within existing resources. The ubiquitous 'commitment-capability' gap that had marked Canada's Cold War experiences was back with a vengeance and, according to Alan Sens (1997) was as much responsible for the incidents in Somalia as the individual transgressions and outdated military customs and attitudes that had been identified by the commission of inquiry.

Sens further suggested that while the unacceptable individuals, practices and units had been removed from the defence establishment, this underlying cause of the Somalia crisis remained and was being exacerbated by a number of contemporary developments and considerations. These included the current policy of double-tasking individuals, units and headquarters – which unduly complicated training programs, preparedness states and deployability levels – and the changing nature of peacekeeping. Here Sens noted that

the multi-component of contemporary peace operations in hostile environments has demanded and will continue to demand a wider range of equipment and capabilities, both military and non-military. This has (and will) continue to increase the costs and size of deployments, as these requirements demand more lift and support capabilities (Sens, 1997: 111).

As importantly, ‘the diverse nature of contemporary peacekeeping is placing greater demands on the breadth of knowledge and training of military personnel’, requiring participants to be well versed in many non-combat as well as combat-related skills and functions. These included conflict mediation and management techniques, riot control and other policing tasks, civil-military liaison duties, and cultural or mission-specific training (Sens, 1997: 111–112).²⁰

The increase in the number and kinds of peacekeeping commitments combined with a static or even declining resource base will place even greater pressure on Canada’s armed forces and its long suffering personnel. It is likely to foster further tensions within the CF and between military and civilian planners, complicate the process of instituting the programs and processes outlined in Strategy 2020 and, if there are further Somalia-like incidents or a significant loss of Canadian lives through incompetence or neglect, threaten further to damage the public’s faith in the country’s existing military institutions and leaders. Sens suggested a number of possible ways of lessening these outcomes and potential consequences. These were: forsaking peacekeeping altogether, placing UN operations ‘at the very centre’ of Canada’s security and foreign policy framework, or being more selective about where or under what conditions Canada would deploy its peacekeepers in the future.²¹ While possible in theory, all three options would be difficult to carry out in practice given Canada’s peacekeeping record, the strong domestic and international expectations involved, the interests aligned against the different options, and the political and other risks involved in any major shift in policy. Structuring the CF solely for peacekeeping, for example, might please some in the community but would ring alarm bells in Washington and other capitols, and be strongly opposed by those in Canada’s armed forces and their supporters who see peacekeeping as an ‘accepted activity rather than a core concern’ and argue that, in view of Canada’s successful peacekeeping record, there is little need to question or change existing defence force structures, priorities and

values (Malcolm, 1993).²² As Sens himself acknowledged, this means that Canada’s most likely response to the current problems and pressures will be to continue to muddle through:

to try to stay the course, maintaining participation in a wide range of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. At the same time, the government will have to concede that various restraints will prevent Canada from contributing to all future UN operations. If the government moves toward developing a greater capacity to contribute certain niche capabilities, it will have the option of offering some contribution during times when no infantry formations are available, without exerting counter-productive demands on land force units (Sens, 1997: 119).

A further option would be to recognise that the end of the Cold War and the forces that brought it about are changing fundamentally the circumstances that favoured traditional ‘middle powers’ like Canada and Australia, and begin to develop alternative security strategies, structures and responses which better suit the ‘new times’ into which we are moving. As Charles-Phillipe David and Stephane Roussel (1998) argued, there is now less need for ‘independent’ middle powers to mediate between the great powers – which are tending to settle their disputes themselves – and less scope or capacity to use traditional multilateral institutions for agenda setting or problem solving. These latter roles are being increasingly usurped by the major powers on the one hand, which have the resources and political clout to mobilise international opinion and where necessary action, and by increasingly powerful social movements and international non-government organisations on the other. In order to maintain their stature in the international arena therefore, middle powers have either to try and compete directly with these global actors, which would require a wholesale increase in resources devoted to these means, or revise their basic approach. As David and Roussel concluded:

To gain international influence, governments must now think in different terms; they must have the ability to grasp problems at many levels (local, national, regional, global) and to negotiate with very heterogeneous players who are not necessarily operating within a state framework. It is by developing their capabilities in this sphere – rather than clinging to behaviours and policies from a

bygone Golden Age – that Middle Powers can hope to preserve a measure of international influence (David and Roussel, 1998: 150).

Indeed, the basis for this kind of fundamental rethinking already exists in the policies and activities of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Long advocates of reconceptualising security to take account of continuing developments in Canada's international circumstances, departmental leaders and their current minister, Lloyd Axworthy, are now advocating the concept of human security as an appropriate organising principle for Canada's foreign and broader security policies (see DFAIT, 1999).²³ Such an approach seeks to look at existing security problems from a human as well as a national and international perspective. While human security does not supplant national security, it provides a better and more complete understanding of the various insecurities presently confronting people across the globe and possible paths around these. Importantly, human security is fundamentally about the protection of human values and needs, a concern that has a deep resonance with the Canadian people, and provides an alternative, cheaper and possibly more fruitful means of exerting influence in a post-Cold War and post-industrial age. Evidence for this last prospect can already be seen in the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunal under the Treaty of Rome and in the highly successful Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines (which is being touted as the new model for pursuing arms control in a globalised world). These successes are likely to encourage Axworthy and his supporters to move further in this direction and, in so doing, place increasing pressure on Canada's defence establishment to become more involved in UN peacekeeping and related human security tasks.²⁴

Conclusions and lessons for Australia

As they entered the new millennium, Canada's defence decision makers had not only to devise a new strategy for defending the country and its interests in a post-Cold War and increasingly post-industrial world, they had also to work out how to do this from within a declining resource base, deal with the consequences of the Somalia incident and other revelations of harassment and abuse, exert control over a number of

internal brushfires, fight off their various bureaucratic and other critics and adversaries, regain the confidence of the military in their leaders, and restore the faith of the people of Canada in the country's armed forces and institutions. Many of these problems and concerns were largely self-inflicted, the inevitable product of the armed forces being required to do more and more with less and less and the inability or unwillingness of successive political and military leaders to say no. Some reflected the changing nature of civil-military relations and other trends in Canada itself such as increasing racial and ethnic tensions, the growth in postmaterialist and internationalist sentiments, and the ascendancy of economic rationalism. Still others were symptomatic of the changing times that Canada and the world were experiencing as a result of the twin forces of globalisation and fragmentation: increasing turbulence and uncertainty, a growing sense of alienation and powerlessness, and increasing dislocation from, and disenchantment with, traditional power structures and sources of authority. Like all citizens, members of the CF were being expected to play multiple roles and have multiple and often conflicting identities – warfighters and peacekeepers, members of a regiment or a single service or a unified, joint service organisation, national and global citizen, and so on – and were finding this experience difficult and unsettling.

Whatever their causes and origins, the problems and concerns that were bedeviling Canada's defence decision makers had to be dealt with if the nation and its armed forces were to progress. The difficulty was that just as the problems were multifaceted and complex so, in many cases, were the solutions, requiring changes and accommodations that were neither straightforward nor easy to achieve. There were forces within the military itself and beyond who were strongly opposed to any move away from the military's traditional warfighting roles and capabilities, much less a wholesale restructuring in that direction. On the other hand, the historical tendency of Canadians in general towards seeing the country's defence forces as a vehicle for pursuing broader foreign policy and human security interests had, if anything, strengthened in the wake of the end of the Cold War, making it more and more difficult for populist governments not to embrace such changes. While Canada's military experiences and traditions continued to play a central role in its popular imagination, these experiences now included, and perhaps were becoming dominated by, the activities

and values of its peacekeepers as well as its warfighters. As the military dimension of Canada's popular consciousness became increasingly influenced by its peacekeeping rather than war-fighting activities, moreover, the military itself became more and more isolated and the basis for both popular and political support for, and awareness of, the CF in Canada began to dissipate. This fueled, in turn, continuing government indifference to the state of the country's armed forces and public alarm at some of its activities.

These contending pressures, interests and imperatives reduced the scope for manoeuvre and increased the incentive for policy makers either to do nothing or as little as possible in practice while promising much in theory. The maintenance of the *status quo* may have suited the traditionalists within Canada's defence establishment and broader community but tended to postpone rather than address many of the problems and dilemmas arising from Canada's changing times. As Dean Oliver argued, it also left the CF and the defence establishment vulnerable to further attacks from its critics and adversaries:

the seeds of discord in the current policy environment are everywhere in evidence, and with the Defence Department rendered to a certain extent, *hors de combat* by the public bloodletting occasioned by Somalia, the military remains in a poor position to protect itself against either budget cutters at the cabinet table or defence reformers inside or outside the government's ranks (Oliver, 1998: 109).

As importantly, any refusal to change what were seen by many in the community to be outdated and anachronistic military values and practices could see the defence establishment's long-standing role in shaping the country's overall security policies and priorities diminished, perhaps even usurped by other government departments or actors. Indeed, the increasing privatisation of Canada's defence establishment and restriction of its activities to a specific group of 'core' operational capabilities and functions, was setting it up for such a move. If it was not careful, the CF could become literally the arm of Canada's foreign policy makers. While such a move would be in keeping with Canada's reputation for vanguard politics, and may not be such a bad thing especially in the longer term, it would certainly ring alarm bells in Washington (an outcome that might

actually be welcomed by many Canadians) and could be a little premature given the changing nature and scope of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. Yet while these so-called 'second generation' operations require more robust or combat-capable forces, this does not necessarily mean the kinds of forces (and associated organisational and value structures) that featured in Canada's Cold War NATO plans or in the establishment's current RMA fantasies.

In view of the different issues and interests involved, it is probable that we have not seen the end of the turbulence, turmoil and tensions that characterised the Canadian defence scene in the last decade of the twentieth century. While such a possibility is likely to alarm many within the defence establishment, it is not necessarily a bad thing. Canadian defence, like other areas of public and private policy, is being buffeted and swept along by much broader changes taking place both within Canada and beyond its borders, changes which are continuing to undermine or raise questions about the way we see ourselves and the world, and how we need to deal with what we are seeing. Like the wider political, economic and social structures in which it is embedded, Canada's military establishment and associated culture are undergoing a basic, and necessary, transition: from a modern towards a post-modern, post-industrial or even post-military form.²⁵ It would be unusual if such an event did not generate angst and anguish among those directly involved and affected.

Have Australia's defence decision makers anything to learn (or fear) from the Canadian experience? There is a tendency on the part of Australian policy makers to be a little smug about their Asia Pacific neighbours and their problems. The Canadian experience – over unification, the integration of its national defence headquarters, Somalia, and peacekeeping policy and practice generally for example – has often been used to engage in our tendency for 'big-noting' ourselves and to defend the military *status quo* down under (for an interesting discussion of the origins and practice of 'big-noting', see Gerster, 1987). These kinds of criticisms, which are largely anecdotal but nonetheless reasonably widespread, are somewhat disingenuous since, in spite of their different interests and strategic locations, the overall trajectories of defence in the two countries followed remarkably similar paths. While not unifying its forces, Australia nonetheless moved from a single to a joint service operational command

structure which is becoming more and more functionally-aligned and mission or outcome orientated. Like Canada, it recently civilianised many of its 'non-core' functions and is effectively unifying its combat support capabilities (for much the same reasons as Canada sought to unify its forces overall). The 1996 Defence Efficiency Review integrated Australia's senior military and civilian planning staffs into a single Defence Headquarters Staff, and sought to cut back the number of personnel serving in non-combat areas. To the dismay of some in Australia's armed forces, peacekeeping figured more and more prominently in both Australia's official rhetoric – such activities can now shape Australia's defence force planning 'at the margins' – and the images of the military being presented to the public (Cheeseman, 1998a). Finally, as is their wont generally, Australian policy makers have been more than prepared to utilise, in some cases without attribution, a number of Canadian ideas and initiatives relating to defence and security.

There are some important differences between the Australian and Canadian experiences and milieus however. To begin with, Australia has not suffered a Somalia-like incident – although it could be argued that this is as much due to good fortune and a more pliant media than to good management. Australia's defence establishment has had its share of internal scandals which have attracted considerable, if short-lived, media attention and have fostered alarm in sections of both the community and the military. These included revelations of sexual harassment in the Navy and within the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra, the on-going Collins-class submarine saga, and the so-called 'Blackhawk' and 'Westralia' affairs where there were hints of official cover-ups and a belief that junior officers and other ranks were disproportionately blamed for accidents in which a number of service personnel were killed. While these and other incidents produced important and timely procedural and policy changes, they did not lead to the comprehensive and painful but necessary dissection of Australia's contemporary military forces and culture that we saw take place in Canada in the wake of Somalia.

Second, while not insignificant, the budgetary pressures on Australia's defence planners have not been anywhere near as severe as those confronting their counterparts in Ottawa. Australia's 1987 defence white

paper, which had been developed by the Hawke Labor Government within the context of the Cold War, promised to increase Australia's defence expenditure by about three per cent a year (in real terms) for a period of five to ten years. As with Canada, this promise was not fulfilled and Australia's spending on defence remained effectively at the 1987 levels. In spite of this, Cabinet continued to approve the major equipment purchases that had been flagged in the white paper and, again as happened in Canada, the Defence Department was forced over the ensuing years to implement a range of efficiency and other cost-cutting measures in order simply to meet Labor's original 'wish list' (see Cheeseman, 1990; Brown, 1994 and Shephard, 1998).

Continuing budget restrictions combined with a policy of diverting money from the 'soft' areas of the defence budget into capital investment adversely affected the ADF's training and operating schedules, ran down its holdings of ammunition and other 'consumable stocks', and, to the increasing chagrin of those directly affected, saw a deterioration in the living and other conditions of service of Australia's military personnel. As in Canada, these problems were compounded by government decisions to commit Australian forces to UN and other post-Cold war peace operations in places like Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, Rwanda, Bougainville and East Timor. While all but the last of these missions were able to be met from within existing resources (supplemented by one-off payments from Treasury and the United Nations), concerns about the increasing costs of peacekeeping and its impact on Australia's self-defence capacity began to feature in the specialist literature and led the Howard Government to request the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade to conduct an inquiry into the suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war. At the time of writing, the Joint Committee has still to table its report, but is likely to recommend that Australia increase its overall defence expenditure in order that the Army can better prepare itself for these 'new' and expanding roles.²⁶

Indeed, in launching a subsequent public discussion paper on defence entitled *Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force* (Department of Defence, 2000), the Prime Minister, John Howard, made it clear that he will increase Australia's existing defence budget although he gave no indication of by how much. The likelihood that this will occur with little or no public

opposition points to a third and important set of differences between the Australian and Canadian contexts. While the strategic cultures and popular military myths of the two countries have much in common – both are portrayed as ‘unmilitary’ countries, both have relied on their respective allies for protection, both celebrate the exploits of their part-time, largely citizen-based armies, and both have sought to ensure their own security by helping their ‘great and powerful friends’ meddle in world affairs – they also differ in some important respects (more detailed discussions of each country’s strategic cultures are contained in Haycock, 1994; Murray, 1994 and Cheeseman, 1998b). Canada’s proximity to the United States has, in recent times at least, enabled its population (and politicians) not to take the issue of defence as seriously as they might. Canada would always be under America’s nuclear (and non-nuclear) umbrella and could act accordingly. This is not the case for Australia and Australians who, in spite of never being seriously threatened militarily, have remained fundamentally insecure, nervously scanning the horizon for potential enemies and sources of instability and automatically translating disputes and military conflicts taking place in areas remote from the country into direct threats to Australia’s own national security and interests.

As a consequence, military forces and traditions have occupied a much higher place in Australia’s public and political consciousness than they do in Canada’s. Canada has nothing like Australia’s Anzac Day for example – which celebrates the exploits of (largely male) soldiers at Gallipoli and subsequent wars, and is seen by many to represent the country’s true national day – nor has it accorded its peacekeepers and their leaders the kind of rapturous homecoming that was given to Australian troops returning from East Timor. A second consequence is that dissenting voices and opinions on defence have also tended to be more marginalised in Australia, rendered silent by the Anzac and other military myths in which Australian citizens were ‘educated’ and which conflated Australia’s security interests with those of its imperial benefactors. There has been no (overt) tradition of radicalism in the area of defence and security in Australia and, since Vietnam in particular, no popular or political basis for fundamentally questioning existing policies and practices (Dalby and Sullivan, 1999).

While this makes for a less stressful working and policy environment, it lessens the pressures on Australia’s

military establishment to consider and undertake the kinds of reviews and reforms we are witnessing in Canada. This not to say that Australia’s defence establishment and armed forces are completely immune from public pressure. Clearly they are and increasingly so as Australia’s social composition and culture is being changed by such things as Asian immigration, feminism and Mabo (see Smith, 1995).²⁷ Yet Australia’s traditional military myths and their underlying values remain strong and are being reinforced by successive governments, and the armed forces themselves, through such activities as Anzac Day, military tattoos and displays, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli landing, the building of war memorials and commemorative highways, and the expansion of the size and programs of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. This must give us some cause for concern over whether Australia and its defence establishment will be able fully to adjust to the ‘new times’ we are entering.

Notes

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² Other important accounts of the Somalia affair and its implications are contained in Bercuson, 1996; Coulon, 1998; Sens, 1997; and Winslow, 1997 and 1998.

³ Useful discussions of some of the key characteristics of these ‘new times’ are contained in Booth (1998), Clark (1997), Falk (1995) and Nossal (1998). Possible implications of these ‘new times’ for military force(s) are discussed in Burk (1994), Buzan and Herring (1998), Holsti (1996) and Snow (1995).

- It should be noted that while there is broad agreement that we are on the brink of a new era in international politics, there is much less consensus on what this era will (or should) eventually look like. Recent overviews of some of the alternative futures being canvassed are given in Buzan (1995), Harkavy (1997) and Kaufman (1999).
- ⁴ The white paper nonetheless stated that 'the Government is willing to commit maritime, land and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations' and functions including: the preventive deployment of forces; peacekeeping and observer missions; enforcing the will of the international community and defending allies; post-conflict peacebuilding; measures to enhance stability and build confidence; and training for multilateral missions including peacekeeping.
- ⁵ According to Fraser Holman (1997: 32), the Minister 'was looking for analysis and proposals to provide Canada with efficient and effective military forces, with attention [given] to: management and command; military ethos and discipline; selection, promotion and leadership in the office. The review would also build on the findings of a Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves which had been appointed by Collette in October 1995 and delivered its report in November of the same year (see Gibb, 1996 for a summary of the Commission's recommendations).
- ⁶ These were subsequently published in March 1997 as a DND policy document entitled *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability* (DND, 1997b). A second edition of the document, entitled *Organization and Accountability* (DND, 1999a) was released by the Department in September 1999.
- ⁷ These included that: a university degree be the future prerequisite to officer commissioning; the existing programs at a number of existing officer training and staff colleges be reviewed; a formal selection process for senior leadership and command positions be created; and a number of general officer positions be either reduced or downgraded. The report also recommended an immediate pay rise for all ranks and that the DND report annually on the implementation of the review's proposals as well as on the overall 'state of the Canadian Forces'.
- ⁸ As Bland and others argued, the process of 'structural disarmament', or 'rust-out' as it was later termed, was not helped by the Canadian military's refusal to be more discerning about the kinds of equipments and capabilities they needed to possess.
- ⁹ In her consultant's report to the Commission, for example, Donna Winslow (1997) described a range of complaints and criticisms made by individual members of the services and attributed to such developments as unification of the armed forces, the introduction of Canada's Charter and Rights and Freedom – which enabled single issue groups in Canada to press for social reforms within the CF – and the introduction of civilian management techniques and values into the existing equipment acquisition and defence planning processes.
- ¹⁰ The feeling was so strong that the Committee felt it important that the principles that should guide the 'unwritten contract' between the military and the government needed to be restated. It also made a number of detailed recommendations aimed at improving the living conditions and pay and allowances of the members of the armed forces, the responsiveness of the military bureaucracy to their needs and concerns, and the means of recruiting and maintaining them in the future.
- ¹¹ A key social development was the adoption, by the Canadian Government in 1982, of a formal Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This provided the grounds for a series of subsequent court and other actions that forced the CF to take a much more liberal approach to issues ranging from the employment of women and gays to whether individual soldiers can be forced to be inoculated for overseas service. While the CF, like many of its overseas counterparts, has formally responded to these kinds of 'rights-based' issues and pressures, it is not altogether clear whether its underlying, informal culture has progressed far beyond its traditional, masculinist and combat-oriented roots.
- ¹² Other cost saving measures pursued by the Department of National Defence during this time included: significant cuts to military and civilian personnel (31 per cent and 46 per cent respectively); the freezing of wages and salary increases for six years; the reduction of support costs by at least 15 per cent; reduction of research and development and construction costs by more than 25 per cent; and significant reductions in planned spending on new equipments (see Galigan, 1996: 26–7).
- ¹³ Joel Sokolsky (1997: 38–40) suggested that this increasing interest is unlikely to see the deployment of significant Canadian military resources into the respective regions (a view confirmed by the author's discussions with officials in Ottawa). This is because, first, Canada's policy was being driven by economic rather than traditional security concerns and, second, because Canada has no wish to bind itself to concrete security arrangements in these regions.

- ¹⁴ David Haglund (1997) argued that, paradoxically, Canada's interest in Europe will actually increase as the organisation moves from collective to cooperative security tasks.
- ¹⁵ According to the white paper, the CF would continue to be able to deploy on multilateral UN operations 'anywhere in the world', contingency forces numbering some 10,000 personnel and comprising one or a combination of the following: a joint task force headquarters, one naval task group of up to four vessels; three battle groups or one brigade group; one fighter wing and one squadron of tactical air transport aircraft. The vanguard component of this force, moreover, was to be some 4000 personnel comprising up to two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, one flight of tactical transport aircraft, and a communications and headquarters element.
- ¹⁶ This suspicion is being reinforced by the knowledge that Defence Minister Collette had to be pressured by his advisers to include such references in the white paper (see Bland, 1997: 285) and the current attempts on the part of Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and his department to refocus the country's security policies and practices around the concept of human rather than national security (see below).
- ¹⁷ Paralleling these developments was the growing acceptance that the concept of security itself can no longer be thought of in purely politico-military terms. The answers to the perennial questions '*whose security?*' and '*security from what?*' have to be expanded, in the first case, beyond the state to include individuals, communities of different kinds, and the globe as a whole. The various threats to the security of these entities, furthermore, can no longer be reasonably restricted to other states and their military forces, but now need to include a range of 'new' sources of insecurity or so-called 'threats without enemies' (see Krause and Williams, 1997; Prins, 1993; and Smith and Kettle, 1992).
- ¹⁸ This is clear from a visit to the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa where one of three floors of displays and memorabilia is devoted to Canada's involvement in UN and other peacekeeping operations.
- ¹⁹ In September 1995 the then Foreign Minister, Andre Ouellet, presented a report to the UN General Assembly which outlined ways of increasing that organisation's capacity to respond more rapidly and effectively to the complex emergencies of the post-Cold war era (DND, 1995; Faille, 1995). Officers from the CF were also posted, at no cost to the UN, onto the organisation's military staff and Situation Centre in New York, and support (and, after it was approved, the promise of forces) was given to the Danish proposal to formalise the UN's Standby Arrangement System.
- ²⁰ There is a huge and growing literature on the emergence, characteristics and implications of 'new' or 'second generation' peacekeeping. Some useful examples include Daniel and Hayes (1995), Findlay (1996) and Ratner (1995).
- ²¹ Sens' possible criteria for deciding whether and on what missions Canada's forces would be deployed included: national interest, traditional peacekeeping only, peacekeeping without great powers, and deployment of forces only on niche roles.
- ²² Malcolm noted that this view was maintained in spite of the recommendations contained in post-mission reports submitted by UN contingent commanders and those of two internal inquiries into peacekeeping – MR 1/90 and the so-called 'Douglas review' – for the CF to adjust its command and control, training, logistics support and operational deployment procedures and structures to facilitate Canada's evolving peacekeeping activities. He argued this resistance to change stemmed from the success of the missions to date, the lack of any support for change among Canada's senior military leaders, and the need to deal with other, more pressing matters. For much of this time, 'the organisation was occupied with the central issue of its own survival. Unification, integration and severe economic restraint threaten the perceived core values and structures of the CF and have left little time for the National Headquarters to examine what are considered secondary issues' (p. 14).
- ²³ A good discussion of Canada's evolving security policies and thinking is contained in Nossal (1995).
- ²⁴ An interesting test case for Axworthy and his Department will be how Canada responds to the current US proposal to develop a Theater/National Missile Defense system. The Foreign Minister is said to be opposed to such a system whereas Canada's Minister for National Defence, Art Eggleton, no doubt advised by his department, is concerned that such opposition might undermine Canada's close defence relationship with its southern neighbour. I am indebted for this insight to the ADSC's referee who feels that 'the \$1.3 billion/day in goods that

move across the Canadian–American border will do wonders for concentrating the prime minister's mind and prompt him to come down on Eggleton's side' (a position I am inclined to agree with).

²⁵ For a recent discussion of the emergence of a 'post-modern' military in Canada, see Pinch (1999). Clearly not everyone would agree that the CF is undergoing this kind of transition or that it would be either necessary or wise to do so. As we have seen, some observers believe that Canada's defence establishment has 'lost its way' and needs to (re)discover its traditional roots. Others would argue that we are currently witnessing the interplay of a range of historical pressures and patterns – admittedly within a 'post-modern' or 'post-industrial' context – rather than the emergence of a 'post-modern' or 'post-military' military as such.

²⁶ The Joint Committee recommended that this be done in an earlier report on *Funding Australia's Defence* (JSCFADT, 1998).

²⁷ The defence establishment is also under increasing pressure from the Howard Government to spend the resources it is being given much more efficiently and effectively. This has, in recent years, produced growing tensions between the Minister for Defence and his Department as evidenced by the public brawl between Moore and a former Secretary for Defence, Paul Barratt (who was sacked in 1999) the retrenchment of a range of senior civilian and military officials, and the public lambasting of Defence by its present Permanent Head Alan Hawke.

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